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In this thesis I will examine different types of transcendental 
arguments, and consider how successful they are against the 
sceptic's challenge. My main focus will be on Kant's Critique of Pure 
Reason, which I will compare with a modern transcendental 
argument — that of Donald Davidson — and also with various 
modern approaches to our modal thinking.
I will begin by elucidating Kant's description of time, as a pure 
intuition and the form of all our experience, as Kant argues for this 
in the 'Transcendental Aesthetic' and 'Analytic'. Here, we find Kant's 
most famous arguments for the a priori status of time, but much of 
these seem to be weak at best, particularly in the Aesthetic, where 
the transcendental component is clearly intended to bolster the 
metaphysical discussion, but this transcendental element itself 
depends largely upon the supposition that mathematical and 
geometric proofs are truths which are synthetic a priori. Kant 
himself took this pretty much as given; today, we have non- 
Euclidian geometry, and quantum theory, and this would seem to at 
least introduce doubts, which would not be the case were the status 
of such proofs as certain as Kant believed it to be. This might lead 
us to question Kant's view of time (and space) overall; however, 
there are other arguments in the Critique which strengthen his 
position. And the over-arching thought in each is, indeed, the 
existence of time as a pure a priori element in our intuition, which 
must exist for us, as Kant has described at the outset, as both 
unique and unified, if we are to have any experience at all.
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In each, Kant wants to show that we do, indeed must, possess 
parts of our thinking a priori, this a priori knowledge being 
necessary for any experience at all to be possible. So, in addition to 
his arguments at the beginning of the Critique, which really are 
intended to complement his view that certain truths of mathematics 
and science are synthetic a priori, I will look at two further aspects 
of the Critique where the status of mathematical and scientific 
truths is not leant upon so heavily. The first of these is Kant's 
general attack on relativism — which would state that there are 
different equally-able to be held true beliefs on one world — 
through his view that, for any concept of subjectivity to be possible, 
we must be aware of a world that exists independently of ourselves 
the experiencers. For Kant, this involves there being a necessity 
present in how the objects of the world appear to us, that its 
objects are revealed as causally inter-connected in one space and 
time, in order for us to understand that this world constitutes 
something apart from ourselves — this necessity is not something 
which we choose. This entails that there is an objective, single truth 
about the way the world is. I will compare this stance with a 
similar, modern argument, found in Donald Davidson, which 
depends on our rationality to 'fix' the form of the world.
The second strand is more elusive and found, essentially, in Kant's 
Metaphysical Deduction. Just as much as the receiving of intuitions 
in the Transcendental Aesthetic, the application of the necessary 
elements of our understanding — the categories — depends upon 
the necessary unity of space and time. The temporal order puts 
constraints on our experience that enables us to form synthetic 
judgements about the world around us. This view puts Kant in
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direct opposition to the more modern approaches of Lewis and Fine. 
While Kant may not so clearly disagree with the metaphysics of 
Fine's approach, as it stands Fine gives us no account of the 
relevant epistemology; and Lewis is simply wrong, as a 
consequence of Kant's transcendental argument is that there simply 
is only one space and time, and that this is necessary for us to have 
any knowledge at all. Further, given that not only can we form 
modal judgements, but that this modality is fundamental to our 
everyday thought and speech, Kant's approach, reliant on a priori 
elements in our thinking, gains further credence. In this respect, it 
is a clear advance on Fine's account, which tells us nothing of any 
epistemology whatsoever; and as against Lewis's, it seems highly 
implausible that something so basic, so central, might be 
dependent on anything so counter-intuitive as infinite numbers of 
physically existing possible worlds.
Pulling all these strands together, we generate a strong position for 
the Kantian view that synthetic a priori knowledge exists, and, 
contrary to the sceptic, that we can be certain that the world exists, 
because the necessary rules that bind it (the world) are necessary 
for our having any experience at all. Thus, I will argue, not only is 
this necessity required for our concept of objectivity, it also 
constrains our judgements and enables us to apply modality in our 
thought and speech, something central to our use of language. 
Finally, through an examination of Kant's thought in these areas, I 
hope to provide a more substantial view of the contention with 
which Kant has started his Critique — 'that there are two pure 
forms of sensible intuition, serving as principles of a priori 
knowledge, namely, space and time.' (A22/B36)
5
Despite philosophers' best efforts, the classic sceptical challenge — 
how can we ever be certain of anything? — has never really gone 
away. The transcendental argument attempts to force him to 
concede that we have (at least some) knowledge of which we can 
be certain. The general strategy is to start with a premise with 
which even the sceptic must agree, for example, that we have an 
awareness of ourselves as subjects. From this, the argument moves 
to a conclusion previously disputed by the sceptic, based on that 
initial, agreed, premise. Often, the hope is to re-establish our 
knowledge on a new, firmer, footing, one that the sceptic cannot 
undermine.
Famously, Kant sought to re-establish the grounds of our 
knowledge, following the assault on its supposed conditions by 
Hume, who claimed that all knowledge was ultimately empirical 
(excepting that of standard analytic truths, which Hume termed 
relations of ideas), and hence, in effect, essentially uncertain, 
insofar as there was no a priori, necessary knowledge of any kind. 
This can be seen in Kant's determination to defend the status of 
mathematical and scientific knowledge as synthetic a priori, and 
also, his espousal of the importance of the law of causality in his 
Second Analogy. The thrust of Kant's claim can be seen as twofold: 
firstly, a modal claim, that as 'experience teaches us that it is so; 
not that it must be so,' (A31/B47) some grounds for the necessity 
surely inherent in our mathematical and scientific theorems must 
be present, a priori; and secondly, that Hume is right to say that 
there is no empirically-perceived principle of causality, but that an a 
posteriori principle would not serve our purpose in any case — such
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concepts are present a priori, being as they are conditions of our 
experience in the first place. Hume correctly argues that there is no 
causal law observable through our senses, but wrong to then 
conclude that the perceived necessity is merely a consequence of 
our being accustomed to seeing one event follow another. Rather, 
claims Kant, it is there prior to our experience, and necessary for 
any perceiving of the world to be possible for us at all.
However, Kant's project in the Critique is not merely a defence of 
the existence of a priori knowledge, and hence of our right to claim 
that we can make valid judgements regarding an external world; he 
also has a positive objective, in his seeking to draw the boundary 
between 'good' and 'bad' metaphysics. Of course, the two go hand- 
in-hand, as the delineating of the areas where knowledge can be 
claimed, from where only 'metaphysical juggling' and irrelevant 
reasoning can occur, is achieved through the establishing of the a 
priori and hence necessary conditions for our knowledge. I would 
argue, however, that in an important sense, Kant's real concern is 
not merely with the Humean sceptic, but also with relativism. Kant 
can be seen as bypassing the traditional sceptic's problems, by 
changing the question from 'What is there?' to 'How do we know?' 
He then examines this by uncovering the a priori elements in our 
sensibility and understanding, which for Kant form the 'bridge' 
between our minds and the external world. The price of this move is 
Kant's controversial claim that the objects of our judgements can 
only ever be things as they appear to us, subject to these 
conditions, and never as things 'in themselves'.
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This division raises the threat of a new, arguably more serious form 
of scepticism, that of relativism. Kant wants to show that, contra- 
Hume, our thoughts do not consist of mere appearances, but rather 
that the world is indeed an object for our judgements, with us able 
to relate to the world instead of being locked inside our own heads, 
as it were. We can be sure, then, that there is a world there around 
us. If, however, there is a significant distinction between the 
objects of our knowledge, and what there is in the world, as Kant's 
claim regarding things in themselves seems to suggest, then all 
Kant's efforts are ultimately in vain — we might be assured that 
there is an external world, but we are no further forward in 
defending our knowledge of it, because we remain aware of nothing 
more than appearances, as Hume claimed. Kant has no intention 
though of such a sharp and dangerous distinction, as I will argue 
later; if he were, we might consider the possibility that there is, 
after all, no such thing as objective truth — at least that can be 
known by us — and any judgement that we make on the world 
might, therefore, go awry, depending as it does on our conditions of 
knowledge. Kant seeks to get around this difficulty by claiming that 
the conditions are transcendental, that they do relate to our 
external world, and of course that the conditions themselves are 
not contingent but necessary. A set of conditions for experience 
that might not be transcendental, that might therefore vary from 
one person to another, suggests relativism, and hence a permanent 
lack of certainty; but Kant insists that these conditions are 
necessary for finite, sensory creatures such as ourselves. There is 
no room for relativism here therefore — this just is how we see the 
world, and indeed to suggest that our knowledge might somehow 
be more certain than this — as Hume implies — is really, in Kant's
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eyes, to stray into the realm of the metaphysical juggler. Our 
knowledge could not be more certain, and so the traditional 
sceptical questions make no sense.
The danger of relativism then comes through its challenge that all 
knowledge depends on us to such an extent, that we might have 
different beliefs on the same world. Thus, one way of viewing the 
sceptical challenge would be in terms of its attack on there being 
any, or of our ever being able to attain knowledge of, objective 
truth. There is a clear link detectable between doctrines of 
relativism, and the sceptical line of thought; for instance, if we are 
to take the view that there is no truth of the matter as to how the 
world is, that different people might have different beliefs with no 
way, no evidence in the world, which might enable us to decide 
between them, then we seem to lose our way of ever saying what 
might be right or wrong. All our knowledge begins to slide into 
uncertainty, then, because there is no way of our establishing a 
criterion for what could be considered to be a valid judgement 
about the world. Even if we feel we are justified in holding certain 
beliefs, we have no defence against the relativist who argues that 
there is no 'fact of the matter' at all. On the other hand, if we were 
to show that there were truths to which we had access, then this 
would strike against the kind of global scepticism that we are 
considering. Truth would exist as the subject of our beliefs, and we 
would have a way of assessing our beliefs as constituting 
knowledge or not. Our ability to acquire genuine knowledge would 
be assured.
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In invoking the idea that there are conditions which are necessary 
for all our knowledge, that if we did not have them we would not 
possess any knowledge whatsoever and be completely unable to 
interpret the impressions coming into our senses of the world 
around us, and so be quite unable to experience anything at all, 
Kant seeks to establish that there is no relativism for us as human 
beings. That the conditions of our experience are present a priori 
and hence in his view necessarily, means that for creatures such as 
ourselves, the world can only be interpreted in accordance with 
these conditions. There is no room for a significant divergence of 
thought (and nor, indeed, could there be such a divergence). There 
are certain conditions for our knowledge, and these conditions must 
hold if we are to be able to have such knowledge. They cannot then 
have arisen from experience itself. It  is his further contention that, 
for these conditions to have any import, the world must indeed be 
true to this shape or form of our experience; it is through these 
various conditions — most famously, space, time, causality and 
substance — that the world is able to become an object of thought, 
able to be experienced by us.
Much of Kant's belief in the strength of his position arises from the 
view that the theorems of maths and science are indeed synthetic a 
priori, and that this is not something to be doubted by anyone 
(even a sceptic). We might not share his confidence in this today, 
and even if we were broadly to agree with his view the very fact 
that it is so controversial implies that we need further justification 
for Kant's view, over and above the existence of these fields. As 
stated previously, however, Kant has a second transcendental 
argument, expounded in the Transcendental Deduction. Here he
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argues that, undeniably, we have a sense of ourselves as subjects 
— there is, he points out, always the 'I  th in k / (B131-2) which must 
be able to accompany all our representations, for us to be able to 
be said to have knowledge at all. However, for this understanding 
to be possible, we must have an objective, independent reality, to 
serve as contrast to what is subjective and contingent or within our 
control; and we must have knowledge of this external reality, not, 
as I will argue, of mere appearances (in the empirical sense) in our 
minds.
A similar thought is found in Donald Davidson's recent work. In 
papers such as 'The Second Person' (Davidson, 1992), he illustrates 
his thought by way of an analogy, where he describes the structure 
he believes to be central to our acquiring the concept of objectivity 
as a triangle. His triangle consists of ourselves, the second person 
and the world forming the three points, with communication as the 
baseline. I f  only we on our own were relating to the world, then no 
sense of objectivity and hence subjectivity could ever be 
established; a second person is required, and not only that, but a 
second person who will be in broad agreement with us as to the 
judgements they make on the world (and be able to communicate 
this to us) before we can reach the necessary understanding that 
the world is an objectively-existing reality, about which judgements 
can be true or false. Such an idea of objective truth is only possible 
if we have knowledge of a world which others also see and have 
beliefs about. For Davidson therefore the faculty of language, and 
our ability to communicate with and interpret one another, is of as 
much importance as our relating to an external world.
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Davidson's approach differs from Kant's in that interpretation 
features where Kant has his categories and pure intuitions. 
However, Davidson attempts to tie this ability to interpret one 
another to the way the world has to be through his appeal to our 
rationality, which he argues is necessary if we are to be able to 
interpret at all. His most striking attack against the relativist 
viewpoint comes in his paper, 'On the Very Idea of a Conceptual 
Scheme' (in Davidson, 1984) where he convincingly argues that we 
simply cannot make sense of the idea that there are any different 
conceptual schemes, and, further, that if we cannot say there is 
more than one, we cannot intelligibly assert there is one either. 
Thus he argues against the existence o f'a  dualism of total scheme 
and uninterpreted content,' (Davidson, 1984, p. 187) something 
that he sees as central to empiricism (indeed, as its 'third dogma') 
depicting as it does some kind of organising structure giving 
understanding of uninterpreted, typically sensory, data. It  is clear 
that, for Davidson, any such scheme, if upheld, would introduce the 
possibility of relativism, as schemes might vary, generating 
different, but equally reasonable, interpretations of the same data. 
Thus in arguing against the possibility of such schemes, Davidson 
also refutes the possibility of such relativism. Meanwhile, in Kant, 
we find the depiction of our knowledge as dependent on the 
faculties of sensibility and understanding, where the sensibility 
supplies the uninterpreted content, namely intuition, and the 
understanding, with its organising concepts, is the 'scheme' that 
structures this. Thus Kant can be seen as espousing just such a 
dualist scheme as Davidson seeks to dismiss. I will argue that, 
while it could be claimed that Davidson therefore opposes Kant, the 
two positions are not so different as might first appear, and can
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indeed be assimilated to produce a stronger anti-sceptical 
argument.
A further way to strengthen Kant's position of claiming that we do 
indeed possess a priori knowledge, is found through examining 
modern accounts of our use of modal terms. I will bring this out by 
contrasting various modern approaches, beginning with the possible 
worlds view of David Lewis. His claim is that, when we refer to any 
possible object, that object must exist for this statement to have 
meaning, and its existence is as real and physical as our own world. 
The worlds that contain these objects are removed from our own, 
located in a different time and space; nonetheless, argues Lewis, 
we can know that they are there, or else how could our modal 
judgements have any content?
This position seems incredible to many, but alternatives, such as 
that advanced by Fine, seem deficient in various respects. Fine's 
view is that the possible worlds account cannot capture what he 
regards as the more fundamental notion of essence, and that our 
understanding of an object's essence comes instead through our 
somehow seeing or grasping it. Actually, Fine doesn't quite say this, 
but it seems to be what we are left with — he focuses on the 
metaphysics of his theory and says little or nothing of the 
epistemology involved in his approach.
I will then turn to the work of George Bealer, who offers an 
opposing, more Kantian account of how such knowledge might 
arise, based on elements which are present within our 
understanding a priori. I will move from Bealer's account to an
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examination of ideas expressed within the Critique itself, that, for 
our having any knowledge to be possible at all, it simply cannot be 
that we have experience of other times and spaces. Nor, indeed, 
could there be other times and spaces. So what Kant would say to 
Lewis's account is clear. In accounting for judgements where the 
possible is evoked, I will discuss his employment of the two tables, 
the Table of Judgements and the Table of Categories, and show 
that this provides a way out for us in our modal dilemma, providing 
a means to account for judgements where the possible is referred 
to, without our having to believe in its actual, physical existence, in 
any way (or place).
I will conclude, therefore, that Kant's 18th century account of our 
knowledge and experience is perhaps our best hope of both 
elucidating our modal thought, and countering the sceptic's attacks.
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Chapter 1
Kant and the Synthetic A p rio ri
Kant begins in The Critique of Pure Reason by describing the fate of 
what once was the 'Queen of all the sciences/ (Aviii) metaphysics. 
He describes it as having become a 'battleground/ (Bxv) with no 
consensus being reached between the sceptics, who wish to show 
that metaphysical knowledge is quite impossible, and the 
dogmatists, who would have us unquestioningly accepting all such 
knowledge. Kant regards neither of these alternatives as 
acceptable. Firstly, if the sceptic is to repudiate our metaphysical 
beliefs, then, Kant argues, he must also doubt our reasonings about 
our experience of the world around us. For the same tools of human 
reasoning as are employed beyond the limits of human experience, 
in metaphysics, are also involved in our acquiring knowledge of the 
external world. He writes that metaphysics 'begins with principles 
which it has no option save to employ in the course of experience, 
and which this experience at the same time abundantly justifies it 
in using/ (Avii)
Meanwhile, dogmatism is equally erroneous, leading, as it does, to 
its practitioners being encouraged to 'indulge in easy speculation 
about things of which they understand nothing, and into which 
neither they nor anyone else will ever have any insight/ (Bxxxi)
The employment of dogmatism — 'the presumption that it is 
possible to make progress with pure knowledge, according to 
principles, from concepts a lone/ (Bxxxv) leads to the kind of 
contradictions and futile debates which have characterised 
metaphysics and rendered it a 'battleground/ Reason ends up
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refuting itself because here, in areas such as the immortality of the 
soul, proofs of God through the claim that he is the prime mover, 
and so on, metaphysics ends in contradictions with no hope of their 
being resolved. The failure of metaphysics to produce a consensus 
and justify its claims has left the entire field of human reasoning 
open to sceptical attack.
Kant sees the rectification of this situation as paramount, not least 
because he believes that such enquiry is a part of our nature, 
rendering the abandonment of metaphysics inconceivable. His hope 
is then to effect a similar revolution in this sphere as he believes 
has already been effected in the fields of mathematics and science, 
where once untrustworthy enterprises have been set on a sure and 
non-contradictory path, representing genuine knowledge.
Kant's solution to the problem of metaphysics is to turn the 
metaphysical debate (what exists) into an epistemological one (how 
can we know). He seeks to eliminate the difficulties caused by the 
employment of philosophical concepts alone, and the justification of 
our other knowledge, through an examination of the conditions for 
knowledge itself. This move, to the focus being on ourselves as 
observers and experiencers of the world, as opposed to what exists 
in the world itself, is regarded by Kant as comparable to the 
revolution achieved by Copernicus in science, where he succeeded 
in giving an explanation for the movement of objects in space 
through imagining not the spectator having these objects move 
around him, but rather the objects being still and the spectator 
moving. He writes:
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Hitherto it has been assumed that all our knowledge must 
conform to objects. But all attempts to extend our 
knowledge of objects by establishing something in regard to 
them a priori, by means of concepts, have, on this 
assumption, ended in failure. We must therefore make trial 
whether we may not have more success in the tasks of 
metaphysics, if we suppose that objects must conform to our 
knowledge. This would agree better with what is desired, 
namely, that it should possible to have knowledge of objects 
a priori, determining something in regard to them prior to 
their being given. (Bxvi)
In so doing Kant will, if successful, show how it is that the world 
and all its contents are able to be an object for us — something that 
we, as finite thinking creatures, can interact with and have 
knowledge of. His aim, in establishing the conditions for our 
knowledge, is to fix the boundaries for the legitimate employment 
of our reason. Within these boundaries and subject to these 
conditions, our knowledge will be established as a valid part of our 
experience; outwith them, we can be sure that there is no 
possibility of genuine knowledge whatsoever, and hence that we 
must restrict our reasonings to areas where the conditions of our 
knowledge do apply.
Kant, then, sees no profit in the type of speculation which might be 
seen as the best (and perhaps only) way to completely refute the 
sceptic, where we seek for some kind of'outside' view of our 
knowledge, in order to show that it really does correspond with 
what is in the world. Such a view is quite impossible, and to seek to
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attain it is to stray into the realm of the type of bad metaphysics 
that Kant so despises. It  is impossible because we can never step 
outside of ourselves and know things apart from who we are, and 
therefore we are always bound to have experience only within the 
realms of the conditions of our knowledge. Kant's move is to attend 
to these conditions, rather than seek to attain some kind of outside 
view that we could never possibly validate, oj&r even acquire, being /  
quite outside the realm of our experience.
In the Critique o f Pure Reason, then, Kant sets out to establish the 
conditions for our knowledge. Being conditions for experience itself, 
they could not, as Hume claimed they could, be products of that 
experience at all, and must then be there prior to experience — 
that is, be present a priori. For Kant, this entails their necessity, as 
he believed only a priori knowledge could be necessary: 'Experience 
tells us, indeed, what is, but not that it must necessarily be so, and 
not otherwise.' (A31/B47)
At the heart of the Critique lies Kant's thesis of transcendental 
idealism. Under transcendental idealism, these conditions of our 
knowledge must hold true of the objects as they appear to us, else 
they would be of no consequence, and we couldn't have any 
experience. This forms the 'transcendental' aspect of the thesis. The 
'idealism' arises as a consequence of the view that our mind can 
only condition the way objects are, insofar as they must appear to 
us, not, obviously, that our own faculties could ever actually dictate 
things as they are apart from us, or'in  themselves'. So, while, 
though reflection on our faculties, on the conditions for our 
knowledge, can give rise to synthetic a priori knowledge of the way
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things are such that they appear to us, knowledge of things as they 
are in themselves is quite beyond us. Anything lying outside the 
conditions of our knowledge simply cannot be known by us. We 
cannot assume to know anything of objects as they are in 
themselves, when we experience the world — such a thesis of 
'transcendental realism' Kant emphatically rejects. But this does not 
mean we are bound to accept a Humean or Cartesian view, that all 
we have knowledge of are mere fleeting mental entities, the sense- 
data impressions Hume speaks of and which Kant also refers to as, 
confusingly, appearances, which may or may not reflect reality.
Such empirical idealism, Kant also rejects. The alternative 
remaining to us is transcendental idealism.
The Pure In tu itio n  of Tim e
Kant was famously woken from his slumbers by Hume, and his 
sceptical attack on such concepts as causality. Kant saw that the 
price of this scepticism was too high — the abandonment of such 
principles as that of causality led to the elimination of conditions 
which Kant argued were necessary for our forming any idea of 
ourselves as subjects, and the world as existing independently of 
us. Furthermore, Kant argued that Hume was simply wrong to 
suggest that all our knowledge stemmed from a flow of impressions 
coming through our senses. In and of itself, this could not possibly 
be regarded as sufficient for knowledge, for thought, for what Kant 
terms as experience. To properly experience something, we must 
connect these impressions somehow into some meaningful, 
manageable form — a synthesis — a coherent whole through which 
judgements might arise. For us to be able to form these 
judgements, and have experience, there must be a second faculty
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to that suggested by Hume; Kant terms this the understanding. The 
a priori conditions contained therein, which synthesise our 
impressions and give rise to our judgements are what he calls the 
categories. The faculty, equally important and quite distinct, which 
receives the information from our senses is the sensibility, and it is 
governed by space and time. We have no knowledge of anything 
that might be considered to lie outwith these conditions.
The a priori intuition of time is necessary for all our experience, as, 
while our outer experience is of objects in space, all our inner 
experiences including therefore the judgements that we make using 
these impressions, occurs in time. In a sense, then, time might be 
seen as the more significant of the two, and examination of Kant's 
philosophy of it therefore the more rewarding. Indeed, as well as 
forming half of the discussion in the Transcendental Aesthetic, it 
also forms much of the most interesting discussions in the 
Transcendental Analytic; although it is a spatio-temporal framework 
which Kant describes here, it is true to say that it is time 
particularly which is used to power the argument in, for example, 
the Second Analogy. Similarly, in transforming the synthesis of our 
sensory fragments into useful, informative judgements, as 
described in the Schematism, time is the element that is added to 
produce our experience, to make it genuine knowledge.
The Transcendental Aesthetic
In the Transcendental Aesthetic, Kant takes as his first objective 
the elucidation of what forms the appearances belonging to our 
sensibility. He writes:
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That in which alone the sensations can be posited and 
ordered in a certain form cannot itself be sensation; and 
therefore, while matter of all appearance is given to us a 
posteriori only, its form must lie ready for the sensations a 
priori in the mind, and so we must allow of being considered 
apart from all sensation. (A20/B34)
In order to uncover this form, he states he will:
... first isolate sensibility, by taking away from it everything 
which the understanding thinks through its concepts, so that 
nothing may be left save empirical intuition. Secondly, we 
shall also separate off from it everything which belongs to 
sensation, so that nothing may remain save pure intuition 
and the mere form of appearances, which is all that 
sensibility can supply a priori. (A22/B36)
Thus will be revealed 'two pure forms of sensible intuition, serving 
as principles of a priori knowledge, namely, space and tim e.' 
(A22/B36)
One of Kant's stated aims in the Critique of Pure Reason is to 
demonstrate how synthetic a priori knowledge is possible, which he 
describes as 'the proper problem of pure reason.' (B19) The solving 
of this problem will, he believes, set metaphysics on the correct 
footing, whereas the type of programme pursued by Hume results 
in the jeopardising of all our mathematical and scientific knowledge. 
This is because Kant believes all such knowledge to be both 
synthetic and a priori, and the destruction by the Humean
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programme of the possibility of our possessing any a priori 
conditions for knowledge left it with no means to attain this status.
Kant thus takes it as given that maths and the laws of science 
possess this status of synthetic a priori knowledge; and argues that 
this is a status which both rationalism and empiricism fail to 
account for. This belief — that mathematical and scientific truths 
constitute synthetic a priori knowledge — is upheld by Kant and 
used to form much of his discussion that space and time are indeed 
the necessary forms of our intuition. If  we allow ourselves to be 
somewhat more sceptical than Kant is regarding the status of the 
proofs in these fields, then we will hope to find further evidence 
elsewhere, in his metaphysical exposition of the two.
Many of these arguments seem to be quite insufficient, particularly 
as Kant is going to found the greater part of the Critique on the 
notions of space and time, and their alleged status as pure forms of 
intuition. Much of the discussion appears to employ out-dated ideas 
regarding the nature of each; we now know that neither are 'fixed' 
in the way postulated by Kant, and which did seem so much more 
plausible in the seventeenth century than today. If  this were not so, 
it would be considerably easier to accept the idea of their nature 
being a priori and given to us; however, given that this is the case, 
the scientific descriptions of each seem radically at odds with any 
kind of space and time which might reasonably be described as 
'intuitive'.
To put Kant's arguments of the Transcendental Aesthetic in context, 
then, much of the discussion is perhaps best interpreted as giving
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an alternative view to those of Leibniz on the one hand, and 
Newton on the other. Kant disputes Leibniz's conclusion that space 
and time are mere relations (or possible relations) between 
perceived objects; and Newton's view that they are objective 
existents, and so knowable a posteriori. Kant contends that: 'We 
cannot, in respect of appearances in general, remove time itself, 
though we can quite well think time as void of appearances/
(A31/B46) Here, Kant is making the point that, while we can form 
an idea of time as empty of any objects, we cannot think of an 
object without thinking of it as being somehow in time. Thus, time 
is epistemologically prior to our intuiting any objects. Further, we 
do not perceive time through seeing objects and noticing the 
relations between them, rather, the a priori intuition of time is 
required for us to pick out the objects in the first place. Together 
with space, it creates the framework for all our impressions of the 
outer world, and its necessity entails its being present a priori.
Much of this could be read as a direct challenge to Leibniz's (and Newton's) 
viewpoints; however, Kant seems correct in asserting that there is an importai 
distinction to be made in the relative necessity of time as compared to our 
other
intuitions. Time does indeed seem to be prior to our thinking of objects, and 
receiving impressions. We perceive of objects as being within a spatio-tempon 
framework; we are aware of time passing as we intuit them, and place our ow 
existence within this same, spatio-temporal framework. Regardless of what 
modern
science may have taught us of the vagaries of time (and space), this remains 
as
true for us today as it was for someone in the 18th century. There does, indeec
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seem to be an important sense in which time is a priori, much as Kant 
described.
But is our intuition, that time is necessary for any thinking, any 
experience, to be done at all, correct? Walker (Walker, 1978) sets 
up a counter-example in an attempt to show that experience is possible 
without time.
We are asked to imagine a world where there is, in effect, no time, 
an 'altogether static and changeless world' (Walker 1978, p. 34), 
where a being cannot move and so alter his perceptions, and where, 
therefore, important elements which seem to contribute to our 
forming a conception of an objective world are quite lacking — for 
example, such a being could not form an idea of objects persisting 
while it was not there to observe them. Walker argues that, if such a 
being was in a position to see various shapes of different colours, 
but where here and there the pattern was interrupted as another 
shape began, then it would perceive that one shape was actually 
placed on top of another, as opposed to imagining that it was 
viewing several highly irregular shapes. While the former conclusion 
is the more economical, to reach it, the static being would require a 
concept of depth, of things existing in three (as opposed to two) 
dimensions. How could such an idea occur to a being that never 
moved position, and only saw things from a fixed perspective?
Further, the holding of such an idea would surely be superfluous if 
one existed in a world where nothing ever moved. Unless Walker 
could justify a static being's holding such an idea, then he has not 
shown that experience could be possible without time. He also talks 
of this being as 'making judgements', which surely entails passing
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from one thought to another; again, temporal context seems 
unavoidable.
It  could further be objected that for self-consciousness itself to be 
possible, there must be an awareness of a distinction between the 
objective world and ourselves; and that a static universe would not be 
sufficient to provide such an awareness. In his Analogies, Kant will go 
on to argue that it is our ability to judge, for example, that 
non-perceived objects persist which enables us to form and maintain 
the idea of an objective self. Without the possibility of similar 
patterns being perceived in the static world, Walsh's argument will fail.
The second feature of time (and space) discussed in the Transcendental 
Aesthetic is that of its existing as an intuition. I t  is not something that 
is a feature of'things in themselves', and nor is it a concept; rather, it 
is 'but a pure form of sensible intuition.' (A31/B47) Kant's central 
argument here concerns what he refers to as the 'uniqueness' of time, 
a feature which he expounds 4=^efrby stating that we can only ever 
represent to ourselves one time, and that when we talk about different 
lengths of time, we are simply referring to parts of that whole. Also, 
that we conceive of time as being infinite means, he argues, that 
'every determinate magnitude of time is possible only through 
limitations of one single time that underlies it.' (A32/B48) Time is 
unified, and this is something that Kant claims could only be possible if 
time were given to us as an intuition. If  it were a concept, then we 
could represent to ourselves different parts of time as being of 
different times, and quite separate; but, again, that is not an accurate 
picture of how we (seem to) think. Again, if time were something 
which existed as an object or as a property of objects in the world,
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then we would not have the idea we do of the uniqueness and totality 
of time; rather, we would perceive it as existing in different 'bits' in 
different objects, with no way of relating them to an underlying unity.
Walker points out that even if we granted the uniqueness of time, 
Leibniz could still argue that it existed for us as a system of relations — 
it would just be the only such system. It  does not seem to follow from 
time's uniqueness that it is an intuition. Similarly, its infinitude could 
be explained in Leibnizian terms by arguing that it exists as a series of 
infinite possible relations. So Kant does not appear to have established 
that time must exist as an intuition. However, if we focus on the unity 
(as opposed to the uniqueness) of time, we can perhaps come closer to 
understanding Kant's position. As a transcendental idealist, Kant 
regards time as given, not thought, and so it is an intuition, not a 
concept: time is a whole thing which is given to us, within which we 
can intuit objects. Kant even goes so far as to say that, if there were 
no objects or appearances, then time (and space) would no longer exist 
at all. Thus Kant's contention of the intuitive nature of time can be 
understood within the context of his transcendental idealism.
But, given the advances made in 20th century physics, can we continue 
to hold a view of time as essentially whole and unified? Our intuition 
may be, as Kant describes, that time is like a one-dimensional 
progression along a straight line, but particle physics has discovered 
the existence of'parallel universes', at least on a molecular level, which 
indicates what Kant took to be certainly false: that there are 
different times, unrelated to one another. However, such scientific 
observations may not be fatal to a Kantian view of time. No such similar 
phenomenon has been found to exist for larger entities, such as
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ourselves, and the Idea of such a phenomenon is so counter-intuitive 
that it does not really threaten the strength of Kant's observations. We 
can draw a (perhaps not very scientific) distinction between the fate of 
a particle fired at two slits, and a human confronted with any kind of 
choice. I f  we are unable to formulate a theory to say exactly where 
and how a line should, as it were, be drawn between the two, then that 
is no reason for us to dismantle our inherent ideas of time; rather, it is 
something for science to pursue and fill in the gaps within its theory. 
Another way of putting this could be to say, as Schlick does (discussed 
in Friedman 1990), that it is the concern of the philosopher to expound 
the form of our ways of thinking about the world, and that of the 
scientist to explore, and find laws to describe, the content of that world. 
Thus, the existence of parallel universes does not threaten the Kantian 
view of time as a transcendental whole, because the two are examples 
of different kinds of knowledge. One might want to appeal to Kant's 
own claim that the understanding of certain phenomena is (at least 
temporarily) withheld from us, due to the 'grossness of our senses'.
One might feel that this is expecting the empirical facts to fit around 
our preferred theory, but the point is that the strange results are 
interpreted and experienced within our single form of space and time. 
More difficult is the idea that m atter has been somehow created 
through such processes. While, strictly speaking, a particle of light is 
not matter in the substantial, Kantian sense, it nonetheless has a 
spatial location. However, does a particle of light, produced, not 
spontaneously, but as the result of firing one particle at two slits, 
demonstrate such a creation that would serve to count against Kant?
I suspect not. I t  is surely the role of the scientist to attempt to 
account for this change, which we experience in our time frame, 
and find some way of assimilating it, just as physicists try to find a
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coherent account which can unify the strange results of quantum 
physics with the more intuitive ideas in general relativity theory.
The Transcendental Analytic
It  is Kant's transcendental idealism that supports and informs his 
discussions regarding time. In the Analogies of Experience, as in the 
Transcendental Aesthetic, arguments that might otherwise seem 
elusive, or at worst, weak, are, when given this context, much more 
readily understood. Kant's transcendental idealism provides a 
strengthening framework for his whole enterprise; it then becomes a 
question, not of the conclusiveness or otherwise of his individual 
arguments, but of whether transcendental idealism is in fact a viable 
position or not. Kant's view is that, quite simply, there is no 
alternative: the consequences of Humean scepticism, and the abundant 
errors he saw present in metaphysical discussions based purely on 
reason, led him to pursue this third way.
In the Analogies of Experience, Kant applies his methods to the realm 
of the understanding, wherein appearances received via our sensibility 
have certain concepts applied to them, namely, the categories. Unlike 
the sensibility, the understanding is an active faculty, within which 
objects are 'thought'; that is, that concepts are applied and objects 
arranged within an overall framework, a 'synthesis', such that they 
can inform us, and provide us with knowledge. In the Transcendental 
Aesthetic, Kant sought to establish what could be found a priori within 
the faculty of sensibility; in the Transcendental Analytic, he explores 
what must be a priori in our understanding, such that we can have 
knowledge and self-awareness.
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That we are self-aware is of critical importance in the analogies. Kant 
saw that a strictly sceptical viewpoint would largely preclude such a 
possibility; instead, given that we are self-conscious beings, he asked 
what must be present in our understanding to make this possible.
He believed that within our understanding there must be a framework 
already in place, an a priori set of rules and relations between the 
concepts, enabling us to structure our intuitions and ultimately to form 
a distinction between our inner selves and the objective world. Kant's 
view is that all appearances are subject a priori to rules determining 
their relation to one another in time. There are three kinds of rules, 
one for each mode of time — duration, succession, and coexistence. 
That we require these rules to apply to the a priori intuition of time 
is necessitated by our not being able to perceive time in the objects 
themselves; objects do not come with dates stamped on them. Thus, 
in order for us to have an idea of a fixed temporal framework, a 
system within which we can order and, as it were, date our 
impressions, we require a priori laws to enable us to place and 
interconnect the objects in time. Without these laws, Kant believes, 
we could not interpret and make any sense of our impressions; 
with them, we can create a synthesis, a way of understanding the 
objective world, and hence our place within it. We are able to impose 
order on our impressions, and make judgements concerning them; 
without this fixed temporal framework, everything collapses, and we are 
left with a mish-mash of sense-impressions, and no hope of organising 
them into something coherent.
The first analogy concerns the mode of duration. Kant states the
29
principle of this analogy to be:
In all change of appearance substance is permanent; its quantum 
In nature is neither increased nor diminished. (B224)
What might be read as Kant's main argument here comes towards 
the end of the analogy, where he argues that if we were to perceive 
something as suddenly coming into being we could only perceive of this 
as an alteration in the substratum. Were this not so, then 'appearances 
would relate to two different times, and existence would flow in two 
parallel streams, which is absurd/ (A188/B231-2) Thus, objects cannot 
ultimately start to, or cease to, exist, as this would entail our perceiving 
two different time series. Any alteration in the world of appearances can 
only be understood by us as an alteration in the underlying permanent 
substance — as change, rather than creation. Without this, the unity of 
the series of time is lost, and with it one of the primary conditions for 
the manifold of our experience. And, Kant contends, it is necessary that 
this substratum does not itself increase or diminish, or change its form.
For us to perceive change, there must be something which persists 
through that change, and that something is substance, the fixed 
medium through which we see all change. Kant adds that we cannot 
know the first thing about what this 'substance' might consist in, but 
that, nonetheless, because we can see change, we can be sure that it 
must exist in the determinate way he describes.
An obvious question to raise here is why Kant concludes from our requiring 
that something will persist through a change, that there must be such a 
thing as a 'substratum', whose 'quantum in nature is neither increased 
nor diminished.' (B224) Even granted that we do conceive of time as a
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single series, this unity could arguably be provided in a continuation 
of overlapping substances. This would preclude the need for one 
permanent, unchanging substance, such as Kant describes. A 
substance that persisted through one change could itself be the object 
of another, with a different underlying substance providing the medium. 
As long as there is always something which persists through the 
alteration, our idea of change is maintained, without the unity of time 
being sacrificed. What 'persists' here is simply that there is never a 
'gap', and so never a break, in time. Time remains unified.
Why wouldn't this do for Kant? Why the need for something absolutely 
permanent, when it seems that relatively permanent substances 
would suffice for the understanding of change?
Strawson (Strawson, 1966) argues that this is largely a result of Kant's 
tendency, as he sees it, to identify whatever he established about our 
experience of an objective world, with what he held to be scientific truths. 
In this respect, it is profitable to compare the two principles at the 
beginning of the analogy. In 'A':
All appearances contain the permanent (substance) as the object 
itself, and the transitory as its mere determination that is, 
as the way in which the object exists. (A182)
This contrasts with the version given in 'B', where Kant, as we have 
seen, talks of a substance whose 'quantum in nature is neither increased 
nor diminished.' Here, the emphasis is clearly on a scientific principle 
concerning some mysterious kind of measurable matter, which Kant 
believes he will argue for in the following pages. As Strawson points out,
31
this does not appear to be relevant to a description of our empirical 
experience at all. A category is something which everyone, at least 
implicitly, applies to his experience; but the principle outlined in 'B' 
does not seem to belong to this system. As Strawson puts it, 'The 
pre-scientifically-minded person is quite able to see or think of 
something's going up in smoke... without in any way supposing that 
anything quantitatively identical persists throughout the transaction/
(p. 131-2) Kant would seem to be pre-supposing the existence of an 
item which his own argument does not need in order to fulfil its premises.
However, in his paper'Kant on the Perception of Time' (Walsh, 1967) 
Walsh argues that anything less than constancy of substance would 
catastrophically undermine our whole temporal framework, that 'I f  there 
were nothing stable in our experience... we could not even appreciate its 
instability.' (p. 381) He argues that, while empirically we seem to date 
things and monitor time with the aid of large, relatively permanent 
objects such as the sun, it is necessarily the case that, given time is an 
a priori intuition, even such objects as these are insufficient. Our 
temporal framework is there a priori, and as such only an absolutely 
permanent substance as Kant describes will maintain this structure.
We need to fix our time, found our perceptions, on something, and if this 
thing were itself mutable, it would be something else other than that 
substratum which Kant discusses. Thus, to see something relatively 
permanent is to intuit something further, something absolutely permanent, 
underneath; at bottom there must be such a substance, which is the 
principle of the succession of time.
This idealistic argument offers another way to see Kant's conclusion; 
however, it presupposes that only a fixed substance will allow us to
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perceive time. The significant thing in this argument though is the 
vital importance, for Kant, of the unity and uniqueness of time, 
demonstrated and revealed in the idea that change must never involve 
either creation or annihilation. This then leads him to assert that it 
must rather be observed as an alteration in the substratum, whose 
volume neither increases or diminishes. This fixed framework of time, 
within which ail our experience must occur, is paramount.
The second mode discussed by Kant is that of succession, and here the 
relevant principle is causality:
All alterations take place in conformity with the law of the
connection of cause and effect. (B232)
The Second Analogy can be read largely as a response to Hume's 
scepticism regarding causality. Hume had argued that, despite how it 
may seem to us as we perceive events, there is no causal necessity. 
Instead, when we think, 'A has happened, so B will follow / what we are 
'reading' in the situation is merely an inductive phenomenon. We have 
seen B come after A time after time, and cannot but conceive of the 
same event occurring again.
Kant believed that such scepticism, about something so central to our 
experience of the world, threatened the very possibility of our having 
knowledge of the kind we do. Without a causal law connecting our 
appearances in time, the facility of our relating impressions to an 
underlying framework would, he felt, be lost; and with it the ability to 
form any self-consciousness. As in the preceding analogy, central to 
this argument is Kant's contention that we cannot perceive time directly
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in the objects; thus, we require principles, such as that of causality, to 
make our 'dating', and hence the understanding of our impressions, 
possible. Causality forms a part of the mapping-system that is 
required if we are to avoid having nothing more than an unconnected 
array of impressions, within which it would be impossible for us to 
distinguish those from the external world with those occurring to us from 
within.
Kant attempts to show the different kind of order involved in our 
impressions. He compares the order of perceptions I receive as I watch 
a boat moving downstream, to the order I have when I look over the 
various rooms of a house. In both cases, impressions come to me 
successively — the ship first upstream, then downstream, and the different 
parts of the house. However, we as a subject are conscious of a clear 
difference between the two: in the first, we know that impressions could 
not have occurred in any other order. There seems to be a necessity 
involved here, as the order is determined not just by how I happened to 
perceive them, but by how I had to perceive them in order to perceive 
that event. By contrast, as we look over the house, despite our 
impressions once more being successive, there is no necessity apparent 
to us. These perceptions are what might be termed 'order-indifferent'.
We could look over the house in any order we chose, and still understand 
that we were seeing coexistent parts of one larger object, rather than 
objects which exist in succession. Kant then asks what it is that enables 
us to make this distinction.
It  could be objected that in one sense, the order of my perceptions of the 
house is also fixed. I cannot go back in time, as it were, and look over 
the house afresh; there is only one possible order here, too. However,
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this does not matter to Kant's argument, and if anything actually 
strengthens it, as it helps bring out the force of how the synthesis is 
formed by the understanding alone. Kant's whole point is that as there 
is nothing in the impressions themselves to make us understand them in 
the way we do, and think of them as being either successive or 
co-existent, it must be a pure category of the understanding which 
enables us to make that distinction.
Strawson makes the objection that Kant commits 'a non sequitj/r of  ^
numbing grossness' (Strawson, 1966, p. 137) in moving from the 
conditional necessity we find in perceptive sequences, derived from 
the events occurring in a certain order, to a necessity connecting 
the objects themselves. Thus, while there is a necessary order 
connecting our impressions of a boat moving downstream, it does not 
follow that there is a corresponding necessity linking the events in the 
world. (Strawson then goes on to reconstruct Kant's argument, and 
forms a transcendental argument for a concept of a kind of causality 
from the premise that we require such a concept if we are to have 
self-awareness.)
Might Kant indeed be guilty of'numbing grossness' in his argument? If  he 
were, we might be forced back on to a sceptical conclusion. However, if 
we reflect on Kant's transcendental idealism, we find an answer to this 
apparent difficulty.
As a transcendental idealist, Kant's concern is avowedly not to show us 
anything regarding objects 'in themselves'; rather, he wants to establish 
the necessary epistemological conditions for our knowledge and
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experience of the world. Thus, central to Kant's argument here is the 
transcendental idealist view that our experience of objects is as they 
appear to us, and not that what we experience are sense impressions of 
externally-existing objects, objects which we have no other access to. 
Understood in this way, we can see how Strawson's conclusion is 
avoided, as it depends upon the existence of such an empirical-idealist 
framework. The appearance and the object (insofar as it appears to us) 
are not, according to Kant, as portrayed by the empiricist; so it is not 
that Kant is saying, we have these conditionally-necessary appearances, 
from which he thence derives the idea of the underlying events being 
necessary. Rather, in our experiencing that which is outside us, we have 
already constructed our impressions according to a rule, or we would 
experience nothing at all; in a sense, for Kant, the object as it appears 
to us, and our experience of it, are as one, and they cannot be so 
separated as to leave him open to the charge of committing such a non-
r as Strawson alleges, where we move from the necessity in one u
to the ascription of it in another. And, in accordance with transcendental 
idealism, this experience of events is dependent on the categories of the 
understanding, and these are, of course, a priori; they are there before 
we perceive any sequence, as opposed to being derived from it.
A further objection to Kant's second analogy is that he is guilty of 
confusing 'Every event has a cause' with the much stronger claim, 'A 
necessarily follows B.' Kant seems to wants to establish the latter (this 
will utterly refute Hume's kind of scepticism) but appears, in his 
discussion, to really have been discussing the former. Further, it is 
not the case that from the lack of order-indifference, we can deduce 
necessity; order-dependent impressions are clearly not always 
necessarily connected. For example, someone may step out into a
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road, and be hit by a car. Here, the perceptions are not order-indifferent, 
but the person's stepping out into the road did not cause the car to 
pass. I t  is a mere coincidence, and the two events of the stepping 
out and car passing are to be determined causally by two distinct 
sets of causes, which are of no relevance in understanding the perceived 
event's order-dependence. However, Kant's discussion of 
order-indifference can be viewed as a highly effective means of 
elucidating the distinction which we successfully and repeatedly draw, 
time after time, in our experience. It  may not, as it stands, directly 
argue for our having an a priori category of causality in the stronger 
form, but it does provide a means of demonstrating our possession of 
the category which enables us to see that one event is a/ways caused 
by another, and that we draw this distinction on a basis that is based 
not upon experience — that could not generate necessity — but is 
present a priori.
For, clearly, Kant is right to assert that there is something which we 
notice when we compare events, and that this 'something' forms a critical 
part of our understanding of the world, and our place within it. We have 
an awareness of where we could have received the perceptions in a 
different order and still seen the same object, and where the order is 
necessary in order that we undergo a particular experience.
Given that order-difference does not only occur where there is a 
necessary connection between impressions — as in the case of the car — 
we feel encouraged to look elsewhere for a second argument which 
might strengthen Kant's position here, and also indicate why he considers 
this necessity to be of such importance in the first place, why it is that 
the alternative, that this knowledge might simply be present a posteriori
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must be wrong. In this respect, we find that Kant employs a similar 
argument to that concerning empty time in the first analogy, and asserts 
that there can never be such an occurrence as an uncaused event. He 
states that, 'only by reference to what precedes does the appearance 
acquire its time-relation.' (A198/B243) Thus, if we are to date and 
understand perceptions as coming in the order in which they do, we 
require a necessary causal principle to connect these perceptions — this 
is the framework within which we operate. An uncaused event would 
entail a 'break' in time, and would also mean that we would have no 
means of dating the event. Our temporal framework would disintegrate.
However, we might disagree with this, especially in the light of modern 
physics, where there do indeed seem to be such things as 'uncaused 
events'. But these occurrences do not seem to upset or destroy our 
concept of causality; such events are rare, and perhaps it is this that 
enables us to absorb their existence without any catastrophic 
consequences. As will be discussed in the following chapters, to allow 
any uncaused events will, for Kant, threaten all our knowledge, and 
with it our understanding of our subjectivity, because he believes that 
the unity of time underpins the very possibility of our experience. 
Causality, as one of the principles governing our perception of time, 
must, then, admit of no exceptions, or the coherence of the whole will 
be lost. Walsh argues that, if we admit of one or two exceptions to 
'every event has a cause', it will become impossible for us to draw the 
line, as it were, and know what to admit as a possible exception, and 
what to dismiss; our entire temporal framework will be rendered unstable 
and therefore useless as a means of interpreting the world of our 
perceptions. Perhaps, however, the reason that we can cope with such 
uncaused events as those described in particle physics is that they
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do occur within such a restricted realm as particle physics. We consider 
them strange, and mysterious, but they do not trouble us as regards 
our conception of the world. As has been suggested previously, 
it is for the physicists to formulate rules describing such behaviour. 
Alternatively, if something were to suddenly occur in 'our world', as it 
were, we would indeed question it, and be baffled, calling it magic or 
miraculous, if not a hallucination; our ideas of the world would indeed be 
greatly threatened. So here, too, it is questionable whether the apparent 
counter-example to Kant's thesis is effective.
However, this answer might be considered to be less than satisfactory, 
not least by Kant himself, who sought to establish a complete physical 
system, whose laws governed and connected everything from the 
smallest elements of matter up to the planets themselves. Thus it is 
extremely unlikely that Kant would have remained untroubled by 
these aspects of quantum theory, as something irrelevant to his own 
philosophy. It  is an intriguing question as to what exactly Kant would 
have done in response to this problem; perhaps he would have thrown 
up his hands in despair, and abandoned transcendental idealism altogether. 
However, it seems that there might still be a case to be made in favour 
of transcendental idealism, given the force of arguments such as that of 
the Second Analogy, and our as yet incomplete understanding of the 
physical world.
Kant's view is, then, that for us not just to have experience, but to have 
any concept of ourselves as subjects, we must have a necessary (and 
therefore a priori) spatio-temporal framework, within which to form our 
objective experience. Anything less than necessity would not be 
sufficient; in defying the sceptic, all prospect of relativism is eliminated.
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Chapter 2
Kant, Davidson and the Conceptual Scheme
Kant's transcendental argument to show that our knowledge of the 
world is valid, that the world must be subject to certain conditions 
of our knowledge, is built on a conceptual scheme of scheme — the 
understanding — and content — the sensibility, or rather, that 
which is provided by the sensibility. That our knowledge of the 
world is valid is what, he argues, enables us to make the difference 
between what is subjective, and what is objective, and hence 
generates our own concept of subjectivity. A more modern 
transcendental-type argument, that of Donald Davidson, attempts 
to establish that the world must be as it appears to us to be 
through claiming, as Kant does, that there is no possibility of 
relativism, and, also like Kant, that the possibility of our having the 
concept of subjectivity depends on it. However, Davidson does this 
by arguing that there is no such thing as different conceptual 
schemes, and therefore no single conceptual scheme either. In this 
way, he might be seen as being in direct opposition to Kant, in 
claiming that the advocating of any conceptual scheme is erroneous 
and detrimental to the establishing of knowledge. While it seems 
that Davidson's arguments against relativism are strong, we might 
want to try to retain the Kantian anti-relativist position that our 
knowledge is, necessarily, subject to certain a priori conditions. The 
question then arises — how can the two positions be made 
compatible, with the hope that they will even compliment each £
other, given that both are so close in spirit?
40
In her paper, 'The Metaphysics of Interpretation' (Rovane, 1986), 
Carol Rovane draws direct comparison between Kant's approach to 
metaphysics, and Davidson's. Both share the idea that the 
conditions upon our making judgements, or forming beliefs, are 
where we must turn if we are to formulate any metaphysical 
conclusions about an external world. As Rovane puts it, 'the 
concept of belief (or judgement) must be our point of departure in 
metaphysics.' (p. 419)
DavidsorTs Argum ent
In drawing out her comparison between the two, she distinguishes 
what she regards as two quite separate theses of Davidson's. One 
is more focussed upon by Davidson — at least, it was up to the time 
of Rovane's writing the paper — and that is that, unless we can 
interpret someone as a speaker of a language, we cannot ascribe 
any beliefs to him. This is because, given a holistic view of belief, 
we cannot ascribe any single one in isolation — it is just what 
beliefs are that they cannot be taken in isolation, but always involve 
other beliefs, with which they are interconnected in various complex 
ways. And the only behaviour, Davidson believes, which is rich and 
fine-grained enough to justify the ascription of such a web of beliefs 
is language.
The other thesis is, argues Rovane, made less of by Davidson but 
she believes it to be more interesting in that it is deeper and more 
radical than the former. This is because, she argues, it does not 
assume a third-person perspective as the other does; rather, it 
'concerns the conditions on self-consciousness, or first-persona I 
ascriptions of subjecthood.' (p. 423) According to this thesis, we are
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dependent upon identifying other points of view on a shared 
objective world in order to appreciate that our own beliefs are 
subjective. This is Davidson's 'triangle' analogy; in 'Rational 
Animals' (which Rovane quotes from), and more recently in 'The 
Second Person' and 'Epistemology Externalized', Davidson describes 
a triangle being set up between oneself, a second person with 
whom one can communicate and interpret, and the objective world. 
Only in this way are we able to understand that our beliefs are 
distinct from the external world, capable of being true or false. In 
'Epistemology Externalized' (Davidson, 1991), Davidson writes: 
'Without one creature to observe another, the triangulation that 
locates the relevant objects in a public space could not take place.' 
(p. 201) But this process is itself dependent upon communication, 
'for to have the concept of objectivity, the concept of objects and 
events that occupy a shared world, of objects and events whose 
properties and existence is independent of our thought, requires 
that we are aware of the fact that we share thoughts and a world 
with others.' (p. 201) In 'The Second Person1, he discusses the 
necessity of there being an interaction between (at least) two 
creatures in order that we establish the common cause of their 
responses; to fix something as an independently-existing, 
temporally-enduring object in the world, and so grasp the concepts 
of objectivity and subjectivity, we require the triangle, the base of 
which is communication.
The idea captured by the triangle analogy is, then, that without 
communication between ourselves and at least one other person 
about a shared world, we cannot have any concept of our having 
true or false beliefs about that world, and hence of our own
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subjectivity. We know our place in the world, and hence also that 
we are a subject, through knowing our place in the triangle, and 
this from observing the other two points; the base-line being, as 
Davidson says, communication.
In 'The Method of Truth in Metaphysics' (in Davidson, 1984), 
Davidson moves from this to the argument that a theory of 
meaning for language must therefore reveal features which are 
metaphysically significant. If  we look at the constraints on 
communication — which for Davidson amounts to the constraints 
upon a theory of meaning, modelled on a Tarskian definition of 
truth — we should notice certain features of language that in turn 
will represent certain 'large features of reality' (1984, p. 199) as 
Davidson calls them, allowing us to draw metaphysical conclusions, 
about what the world must be like, if we are able to communicate 
with and interpret one another. While in later papers where the 
triangle is discussed, less emphasis is placed upon the explicit use 
of Tarskian theory of meaning, the idea of our communicating with 
others as being necessary for our own notion of subjectivity, and of 
there being an objectively existing world, which is the only thing 
which could generate a shared experience, is retained and further 
developed.
For Davidson, then, language — or, rather the fact that we use 
language, and can communicate with and interpret one another — 
is central to who we are. It  also provides him with a kind of 
transcendental argument for the existence of an external world. 
Here, the parallel with Kant is clear — where Kant took the concept 
of judgement, and the constraints upon it, as revealing
43
metaphysical consequences (and conclusions about features we 
must have) such that we can form judgements or have experience 
at all, Davidson looks to language and the ability to communicate — 
and, relatedly, to form beliefs — as central.
In both cases, the formation of beliefs or judgements is regarded as 
a crucial indicator of the existence of, and nature of, the external 
world. That this is a reasonable standpoint is assured by the close 
relationship between the concepts of belief anti truth. A belief is 
something which can be true or false, and so in order to partake in 
this concept we must be able to distinguish between the belief 
itself, and the object of that belief. We must therefore presuppose 
the existence of an external world, before we can begin to regard 
ourselves as capable of such a thing as belief; further, we cannot 
formulate the idea of sceptical doubt — of our beliefs as being 
possibly false — without first understanding that there is an 
objectively existing world. So, at bottom, the features of the world 
presupposed by our concept of belief must hold — Rovane says, 'we 
cannot be skeptical about those conditions/ (p. 419)
For Kant, these conditions are those which are conditions upon our 
possible experience. They are the categories, and the forms of our 
intuition, space and time. Davidson's connection with the world 
though might be regarded as more immediate, as it dispenses with 
the classic empiricist dichotomy of scheme and content, famously 
exemplified by Kant in his epistemological division of the 
understanding, which is governed by the categories, and sensibility, 
the forms of which are space and time. For Davidson, the 
conditions on our forming beliefs about the world are those upon
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our being able to communicate successfully with a second 
individual; and, as we have no way of knowing if we do speak the 
same language as they do, we are, he claims, dependent upon our 
being able to radically interpret their speech behaviour. The 
conditions for our knowledge then become those upon our being 
able to radically interpret — the existence of a shared environment, 
our being essentially rational, and the principle of charity.
Rovane considers Kant's enterprise to be fatally weakened by his 
inability to break away from traditional empiricism; in his use of 
scheme and content, she argues, we are still inviting the sceptic in, 
for the result is that we are not bringing our understanding to bear 
upon 'real', objectively-existing entities, but rather on our sensory 
appearances of them. She regards Kant as a 'somewhat rarefied 
phenomenalism (p. 421), who also permits relativism, as, while he 
suggests we cannot conceive of there being other forms of 
experience in the sense of knowing what such experience would be 
like, at the same time we also have our concept of what objectively 
exists tied to our experience, so that there is a possibility of 
someone with a different type of experience concluding that 
different things exist. Rovane admits that here, she is overstating 
Kant's position, but she wishes to draw out the distinction between 
the possible consequences, particularly the sceptical ones, of Kant's 
position, and that of Davidson's. And it seems that there is a clear 
difference, because, whereas Kant, while not advocating relativism 
directly is nonetheless, claims Rovane, 'clearly agnostic' as to the 
possibility of other types of experience, Davidson dismisses the 
very possibility of relativism.
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Here we come to Davidson's famous paper, 'On the Very Idea of a 
Conceptual Scheme'. There, he examines what might be involved in 
the notion of a 'conceptual scheme', and argues that, subjected to 
such a close examination, it 'cannot be made intelligible and 
defensible.' (Davidson, 1984, p. 189) The dualism of scheme and 
content should, he claims, be rejected as the third dogma of 
empiricism, 'the third, and perhaps the last, for if we give it up it is 
not clear that there is anything distinctive left to call empiricism.'
(p. 189) In dismissing the traditional dualism of scheme and 
content, then, Davidson brings us into a more immediate 
relationship with the external world; we are no longer dealing with 
appearances or some other such epistemic intermediary, but with 
actually existing objects. This position is further brought out, and 
linked explicitly with the triangle, in The Second Person. There, 
Davidson reaches the same conclusion through emphasising the 
way we communicate, and what must be the case such that that is 
possible.
While he draws on the implications of radical interpretation in the 
earlier paper ( ’On the Very Idea of a Conceptual Scheme1), the 
emphasis is on the close examination of the idea of a conceptual 
scheme. Davidson notes that, as a philosophical concept, it is an 
exciting one, which, if reasonable, would generate much interesting 
debate in many areas; however, he believes that, 'as so often in 
philosophy, it is hard to improve intelligibility while retaining the 
excitement.' (p. 183)
What looked appealing becomes, on closer examination, 
unintelligible and, what is more, implausible. Davidson shows up
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the implausibility to great effect by focussing on what might be 
regarded as the core of his philosophical outlook — our rationality, 
and our ability to communicate with one another. Here, the thesis 
of radical interpretation does come into play, as Davidson argues 
for his conclusion that such creatures would never come to have 
differing conceptual schemes. Like Kant, he regards us, as humans, 
as being much more the same than different from one another, and 
so regards certain characteristics as essential, and therefore of 
immense philosophical significance.
Firstly, however, the unintelligibility. Davidson begins by discussing 
various different ideas which philosophers have taken 'conceptual 
scheme' to mean. He readily grants the appeal of an idea that 
suggests that views of different cultures, or of society at different 
times, are equally valid. It  implies a move towards tolerance and 
respect for those whose views might seem at odds with our own.
Perhaps the most obvious place to locate a conceptual scheme is in 
language. Davidson gives the example of Whorf's study of the Hopi 
language, and quotes him as writing that:
...language produces an organization of experience. [It] first 
of all is a classification and arrangement of the stream of 
sensory experience which results in word-order...[It] does in 
a cruder... way the same thing that science does... We are 
thus introduced to a new principle of relativity, which holds 
that all observers are not led by the same physical evidence 
to the same picture of the universe, unless their linguistic 
backgrounds are similar, or can in some way be calibrated.
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(Whorf, 'The Punctual and Segmantive Aspects of Verbs in 
Hopi/ quoted on p. 190)
Here, then, we find expressed an idea that is, as Davidson points 
out, very different to that referred to by Strawson when he writes, 
' I t  is possible to imagine kinds of worlds very different from the 
world as we know i t /  (Strawson 1966, p. 15) Here, Strawson is 
talking not about different conceptual schemes, which are 
incommensurable, but about our imaging worlds different to our 
own, which don't physically exist but can be thought about through 
our 'redistributing truth values over sentences in various systematic 
w ays/ (Davidson 1984, p. 187) What Davidson is attacking is the 
idea that the same world, because of different creatures within it 
having different conceptual schemes, might be viewed in radically 
different ways; so different, indeed, that one cannot be 
comprehended by the other.
This is a view located by Whorf in different language communities, 
specifically, between Hopi and English. Our metaphysics is shaped 
by our language, and so, he argues, the possibility exists that a 
language very different to our own will generate a metaphysical 
viewpoint which we cannot participate in. Similarly, philosophers 
such as Kuhn have argued that different scientific traditions 
produce conceptual schemes that are at variance with one another- 
Davidson quotes him as claiming that scientists 'work in different 
worlds/ (Kuhn, The Structure o f Scientific Revolutions, quoted on p. 
187)
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Davidson examines at length just what we might take the notion of 
a conceptual scheme to be. He begins his close scrutiny by giving 
the various ways that the term has been understood. Generally, 
conceptual schemes are thought of as either organising something 
that is given — perhaps reality, or experience — or they might fit it, 
as when Quine writes 'he warps his scientific heritage to fit his... 
sensory promptings/ (Quine, 'Two Dogmas of Empiricism', quoted 
p. 191)
Neither of these views can be made intelligible, he argues. To 
imagine 'organising' something, we must conceive of something as 
consisting of parts, which might be organised — otherwise, what is 
there to be organised? We have to imagine being able to rearrange 
some parts of the whole, for as Davidson puts it, 'the notion of 
organization applies only to pluralities/ (p. 192) We are looking for 
a criterion that will demonstrate that there is or might be a 
language that cannot be translated into our own; however, such a 
criterion is not suggested here. Davidson gives the example of 
organising a wardrobe, saying that if we are asked to organise it, 
we can understand it as meaning that we are to rearrange the 
objects within it, whereas if told we are not to organise the 
contents, but the cupboard itself, 'we would be bewildered/ (p.
192) In a similar way, then, we must understand the idea of 
organising the world or nature, or indeed experience, as entailing 
we organise various items within it. Will this provide us with a 
criterion for a language that while being a language is nonetheless 
not translatable into our own? Davidson thinks not — here, we 
cannot make sense of organising the world itself except as us 
bringing some kind of organisation to bear on the various items
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within it, which isn't what we wanted at all in order to suggest that 
we might really conceive of there being two radically different 
worlds. Further, while we can make sense of minor differences 
between the languages, this itself is because 'a background of 
generally successful translation provides what is needed to make 
the failures intelligible.' (p. 192) But how to make sense of the idea 
of complete non-intertranslatability? This becomes especially 
problematic when we consider that any language which so deals 
with the objects in the world — our world — 'must be a language 
very like our own.' (p. 192) And much the same problems occur if 
we apply the notion of organising to experience — again, it must be 
regarded as a plurality of some kind, say different items of 
sensation like tickles, but these are just the same entities as an 
advocate of this approach would imagine himself dealing with. The 
two languages are thus organising the same sorts of thing, 
whatever we take that to be, and such a language must of course 
be one 'very like our own', which hardly amounts to a criterion for a 
different conceptual scheme.
If  we take instead the idea of fitting, we move onto the thought 
that sentences, or groups of sentences that constitute a theory, fit 
the information from our senses (or whatever other evidence we 
take the concept as applying to). This provides us with the idea of 
sentences being confronted with, or compared to, something 
further, something external — 'for a theory to fit or face up to the 
totality of possible sensory evidence is for that theory to be true.' 
(p. 193) But, argues Davidson, this notion of fitting the totality of 
experience 'adds nothing intelligible to the concept of being true.'
(p. 193-4) It  may say something about what we take the source of
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the evidence to be but 'it does not add a new entity to the universe 
against which to test conceptual schemes/ (p. 194) Such theories 
presuppose that we can find something, something beyond the 
evidence which our schemes 'fit', in order that we can compare 
schemes and so find them to be different. But Davidson's point is 
that there is no third thing, no 'facts', nothing beyond the evidence 
that we might use that would make our theories true. If  this is so, 
then just as before we are in no position to make intelligible the 
idea that there are different conceptual schemes.
The only way out left to the proponent of such a theory is to claim 
that we are looking for two schemes that are both largely true, but 
not translatable. This gets around the difficulty of there being no 
'facts' which might make our beliefs true and provide a comparison 
of schemes, but new difficulties arise. Here, Davidson's theories of 
truth come into play, as he makes the point that, to make sense of 
this criterion, we must be able to make sense of the idea that truth 
and translatability can be understood quite independently of each 
other. And, of course, for Davidson, the two are inextricably bound 
together. The totality of true sentences for our language can be 
given by the form ula,' "S" is T if and only if S,' where 'S' stands for 
each well-constructed sentence in English. This recursive definition 
of truth, whiie not the kind of definition we might want in order to 
explain our concept of truth, nonetheless, Davidson believes, 
represents our best understanding of what truth is — a basic 
concept, he argues, which cannot be reduced. But note that this 
definition operates through translation, and this strongly suggests 
that the two notions, truth and translation, cannot be sharply 
separated from one another. If  this is so, the case of the proponent
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of the conceptual scheme seems very weak indeed. It  looks unlikely 
that they will be able to demonstrate that there are cases of 
schemes which both are true, and yet not intertranslatable. Indeed, 
it is hard even to imagine what such a scheme would look like, 
which fitted the evidence just as well as another scheme, was 
equally true, and yet proved not translatable. How could it then be 
'different? Surely the two would end up looking exactly the same?
So, Davidson concludes that, in both cases, we have failed to find 
something that might be seen as common to two incommensurable 
conceptual schemes, such that we might compare them; and that, 
therefore, we should altogether 'abandon the attempt to make 
sense of the metaphor of a single space within which each scheme 
has a position and provides a point of v iew / (p. 195)
An attempt to justify the ascription of different conceptual schemes 
on the grounds of partial, rather than total, failure of translatability 
fares no better. Here, Davidson draws on his ideas of radical 
interpretation, and the necessity therefore of the principle of 
charity, to show the unintelligibility of this approach, which might at 
first seem the more promising one, given that in its shared, inter­
translatable part, we have provided a common ground of 
comparison between the supposed two schemes.
Davidson holds that belief and meaning are closely interconnected. 
In knowing the meaning of someone's sentences, we attribute 
beliefs to him; and we know the meaning of his sentences through 
our believing that he will tend to hold mostly true beliefs, as we do, 
and therefore that our beliefs will tend to coincide. Thus,
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communication, and relating to others, is possible. To account for 
this, we need a theory 'that simultaneously accounts for attitudes 
and interprets speech, and which assumes neither' (p. 195), and 
this theory is radical interpretation.
Radical interpretation states that we begin to interpret someone, 
with no presupposition of what their sentences might mean, or, 
therefore, what the beliefs being expressed are, simply from the 
idea that they will accept certain sentences as true. Truth is thus 
the crucial notion, the starting point. However, to even get started 
on interpreting the sentences, and ascribing beliefs, to someone 
whose language might be different to our own, we must assume a 
large part of his beliefs to be in agreement with our own. In other 
words, we must assume that they will be as rational as ourselves, 
holding mostly true beliefs, and tending to reject those sentences 
that represent untruths. Then, and only then, can we begin to 
assign meanings to his sentences, and so interpret him.
This foundation of shared beliefs does not, and nor does Davidson 
intend it to, eliminate all disagreement, but this foundation of 
agreement is what, he contends, makes it possible for us to have 
meaningful disagreement. In interpretation, then, 'charity is not an 
option... Until we have successfully established a systematic 
correlation of sentences held true with sentences held true, there 
are no mistakes to make. Charity is forced on us... if we want to 
understand others, we must count them right in most matters.' (p. 
197) Where we find a sentence which they will reject, but we, 
translated into our language, assent to, we might want to call this a 
difference in conceptual schemes — but surely it's just a case of our
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having different beliefs, not different concepts; after all, we can, it 
seems, translate that sentence expressing the belief into our own 
language. There is no reason for us to conclude that what we have 
is a difference in concepts, no evidence available at all.
He then goes on to claim that, if we have found no way to make 
intelligible the notion that there are different conceptual schemes, 
we are in no position to draw the conclusion that we all share the 
same conceptual scheme, either. Rather, Davidson states that 'if we 
cannot say that schemes are different, neither can we intelligibly 
say that they are o n e / (p. 198)
In concluding that we do not operate under any conceptual scheme, 
Davidson believes that we put ourselves in unmediated contact with 
'the familiar objects whose antics make our sentences true or fa lse/ 
(p. 198) A single objective truth is established — there is no 'truth 
relative to a schem e/ (p. 198) Thus, in his rejection of the 'third 
dogma' and abandonment of empiricism, Davidson has found an 
anti-sceptical argument that puts us in direct contact with the 
world. He has achieved this outcome by replacing the idea of a 
conceptual scheme with that of language and our ability to 
communicate with one another, and the necessary conditions that 
are entailed by this process.
The demonstration of the unintelligibility of the concept of there 
being incommensurable conceptual schemes, which provide 
different groups with different metaphysics, coupled with the 
implausibility of the notion as noted by Davidson at the outset, 
makes for an extremely strong case, at least that there are no
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different conceptual schemes. The implausibility is brought out well. 
There seems little to be said against Davidson's observation that, 
for example, Whorf has used English sentences to note the 
allegedly different metaphysics of the Hopi, supposedly generated 
by their so-different language. And yet, if this conceptual scheme is 
claimed to be incommensurable with our own, how could we 
describe it within our own language? Surely that would be quite 
impossible? Put in this way, the position sounds absurd. We are 
saying that, for us to acknowledge a different conceptual scheme, 
we wouldn't be able to identify it as being different because our two 
languages would not be intertranslatable. If  we could see 
something as being different, we would not be seeing something 
different, but something which we could understand insofar as 
being able to compare it with our own. But then, they wouldn't be 
incommensurable at all. If  all we have is language, and the 
available evidence of the world through our senses, then, as 
Davidson says, there is no third thing to give an 'outside' view, and 
enable us to see the two schemes, compare them, and judge their
commensurability. All there i^the 'available evidence' of the world, J
which must be broadly agreed upon by us if we are able to 
communicate. If  we assume that we have a conceptual scheme,
then we can only operate from within that scheme, and so are not 
free to explore and judge another as being radically different to our 
own. Further, if we accept Davidson's view, that meaning and truth 
are inextricably linked, it is difficult to see how any creature, who 
shares our world and is capable of speech behaviour, could possess 
a conceptual scheme either radically or partially different from our 
own.
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Is  there  no Conceptual Scheme?
Is it, however, reasonable to conclude from this, as Davidson does, 
that we have no conceptual scheme at all, and that therefore we 
are in an immediate relationship with the objects of the world after 
all? What he is accrediting to us sounds like the intellectual 
intuition, which Kant discusses God as possessing (if he exists) in 
the Critique. There, Kant draws a comparison between this 
intellectual intuition with our sensory one, where we attain 
knowledge of the world through our senses and so necessarily 
require a means of drawing in the sensory information from the 
world, and a means of organising these pieces into a whole, such 
that we might have experience. If  God does exist — and Kant 
insists that we can only exercise faith here, that we cannot know, in 
the ordinary sense, that he exists — then, being infinite, he will 
immediately grasp objects not as they appear, but as they are in 
themselves. He has no need of a scheme to understand them, as 
we, finite beings, do. We do not need to have a strong belief in 
God's existence to get Kant's point here, and see the distinction.
We can understand that, to be infinite as God is, would entail our 
having no need of the forms of space and time, to place objects in 
the world and orientate ourselves within it. Similarly, the categories 
would be superfluous, as we would apprehend each object as it was 
in itself, without requiring the synthesis of intuitions governed by 
the categories. And then, we would not be seeing objects as they 
appear to us, represented as being within space, but just as they 
are in themselves.
While Kant understands the possession of scheme and content as 
being just how we can and must acquire experience as humans,
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Davidson has a quite different view. He suggests a picture of us as 
being iike Kant describes God as being, with no need whatsoever of 
a scheme to handle content, which implies our being in a direct 
relationship with them as things in themselves, for without a 
scheme, there simply is no other way of knowing them. However, 
even if we make appeals to such ideas as 'of course there is always 
a possibility of error, because we never have the perfect conditions 
for knowledge', there seems to be an intuitive resistance to the idea 
that it is even possible that we could be in the same kind of 
relationship with the world as a perfect being would be. We are, as 
humans, broadly rational, as Davidson suggests; and this is very 
much of the essence of who we are, so it cannot be too 
unreasonable to base much of your philosophical views and 
arguments around that very notion. But are we perfectly rational? 
And if not, can we conclude, as he does, that we can and do enjoy 
an immediate relationship with the objects as they are in 
themselves, just as Kant depicts God as doing? It  seems unlikely.
This point can be further brought out when we consider the 
criticism that charity — a principle which takes into account our not 
being perfectly rational — is not sufficient on its own to guarantee 
that the world be any particular way. In her paper, Rovane shares 
this view. While in broad agreement with Davidson's Kantian 
strategy, that is, of looking at conditions on belief as having 
metaphysical consequences, she argues that Davidson is mistaken 
in his next move, where, in 'The Method of Truth in Metaphysics', 
he goes on from this to argue that we look for these metaphysical 
results in the constraints on a theory of meaning which operates in 
our communicating with one another. She argues that the central
57
concept of the principle of charity is of no help in our search for 
metaphysical truths, because it does not entail the world being any 
one particular way: 'Charity tells us we are all in agreement and 
what we agree on is in fact the truth (more or less). But it does not 
tell us what it is that we are all in agreement about... By itself the 
constraint of charity doesn't seem to require agreement about 
anything in particular.' (p. 426) If  this is right, then Davidson's 
move, to seeing the constraints on meaning as the stopping-off 
point for metaphysical analysis, seems unjustified.
Rovane asks us to imagine interpreting someone as having mostly 
true beliefs about her sensory states, who, being mostly right about 
these and knowing more beliefs than we do about objective 
circumstances, will be being interpreted in a way that satisfies the 
condition of charity. But, says Rovane, we have interpreted her to 
be an idealist, and if charity can allow someone to be so 
interpreted, then charity does not look like a contender for the role 
Davidson intended it to have. We would have to look elsewhere, for 
additional arguments to rule out this possibility, and this would go 
against Davidson's argument that the constraints found in meaning 
theory are sufficient for his purpose. So we can see here that there 
are clear difficulties with Davidson's account, if we wish to establish 
metaphysical conclusions about how the world must be, which 
suggests an opening for a more Kantian approach.1
1 Davidson's own attempt to strengthen his position involves the 
description of an omniscient being, who believes all and only true 
beliefs. Such a being must be able to interpret us, and we him, and 
this, of course, will only be possible if our beliefs tend to coincide.
As a result, we must believe largely true statements about the
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The main areas where we would see Davidson as being in dispute 
with Kant are, then, also the areas where we would consider his 
account to be weaker and in need of modification in any case. Thus, 
despite Davidson's eagerness to dismiss the 'third dogma' of a 
conceptual scheme, and introduce a radically different way to 
conceive of ourselves as relating to the world, it seems that, if we 
take the main arguments of his paper, which criticise so 
devastatingly the notion that there might be different conceptual 
schemes, the similarities between what they point towards, and the 
view espoused by Kant in the Critique o f Pure Reason are more 
striking than these differences. And we would surely want this to be 
so, as both positions are so compelling. While Kant, famously, does 
believe that we attain knowledge through a scheme and content 
system, that 'Thoughts without content are empty, intuitions 
without concepts are blind' (A51/B75), it is equally central to his 
approach that|baflas  humans our 'scheme' cannot be otherwise. If  
we are humans, then, for us to have any experience, form any
world, or else his interpreting us would be impossible. This is an 
interesting, perhaps un-Davidson-like move, but more to the point, 
if it does succeed in establishing that we are largely correct about 
the world, it only does so by a method which invokes a god-like 
being and tells us nothing whatsoever about ourselves, about what 
makes us largely right about the world. Kant's move, on the other 
hand, does this by outlining something true about the creatures we 
are. He both fixes the world, and gives us insight into ourselves. 
Further, it's interesting to note that here, Davidson seems to 
concede Kant's point, that the idea of such a being does have a role 
to play.
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judgements, we must have the described scheme as a necessary 
condition. It  simply could not be otherwise. His insistence on this 
point, and on the necessity of or our intuition and understanding 
being as he describes them to be, puts him in spirit, at least, very 
close to Davidson's position in 'On the Very Idea of a Conceptual 
Schem e/ Davidson argues that, as rational creatures, we relate to 
and experience the world in much the same way, with only small 
variations, disagreements, between us; and that it could not be 
otherwise. To have language and communicate is to partake in this 
shared environment. For Kant, it is equally necessary that our 
having knowledge at all is dependent on our possession of the 
categories, through the intake of sensory intuitions in the form of 
space and time, and our ability to synthesise these into experience. 
There are no alternatives for either Kant or Davidson — neither has 
any space for relativism, of any kind. Where Davidson contends 
that we must, in order to radically interpret, assume that others 
hold mostly true beliefs as we do ourselves, Kant argues for the 
unity of time, and, as will be seen in Chapter 4, for the conclusion 
that everything possible in the world, and necessary in the world, is 
actual; that there is one world, which we all inhabit and share, 
where objects are causally interconnected in a single spatio- 
temporal framework, and nothing else can possibly exist for us.
For Davidson, then, to assume someone had radically different 
beliefs would be to hamper our ability to interpret and communicate 
with him, and, if there was only the two of us in the world, and we 
were so prevented from interpreting one another, we would be left 
quite unable to attain any knowledge, for on such communication 
our being able to place ourselves in the world, and gain a concept
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of objectivity, depends. And for Kant, to imagine a world where 
time is not one, where things can be spontaneously created or 
annihilated, is to imagine a world where knowledge would be quite 
impossible.
Unsurprisingly, therefore, we can see how Davidson's triangle 
analogy plays a similar role in his anti-sceptical argument to Kant's 
in the Second Analogy. In the passage, quoted by Rovane, from 
'Rational Animals' (Davidson, 1982), Davidson describes how not 
being bolted down to the earth, 'I  am free to triangulate,' (p. 327, 
quoted p. 423) and so to place objects correctly within my 
environment. We know, as Davidson says, where they are.
Similarly, we get an idea of our objectivity through the triangle 
which is set up between ourselves, a fellow communicator, and the 
world which we share and which enables us to communicate with 
and interpret one another. An understanding of an external world 
enables us to experience ourselves as subjects, as we can gain a 
third-person perspective on the world through our communicating.
Similarly, Kant employs the notion of a causally-connected world, 
perceived by and experienced by us, to explain our acquisition of 
the concept of the subjective and objective. Here, we see that there 
is a necessary order to certain of our impressions, and not to 
others. While all our thinking is done in time, in sequence, we know 
that some of these 'apprehensions' are of objectively-ordered 
events, whereas others simply constitute an arbitrary arrangement.
Kant's famous contrast is between looking over the rooms of a 
house, and watching a boat travel downstream. In the former case,
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I am well aware that I am not perceiving any event — although 
there is an order to my impressions of the house, this is not a 
necessary order, and I know that in fact I would be free to look 
over that house in any order I chose. However, in the case of the 
boat moving down river, while there is, again, an order to my 
apprehensions, I do not see these as being merely chosen by me — 
rather, I know that there is a necessity at work, and that it could 
not have been otherwise. I do not need to travel back in time, and 
try the procedure again, to check if there is a possibility of my 
having perhaps perceived the order of the appearances of the boat 
or the house differently — I know already. And just as well, because 
without this, Kant believes, we would have no possibility of having 
any experience of the outside world, and therefore no way of 
perceiving it as objectively existing, of our impressions as being 
anything other than mere mental appearances with no connection 
to anything outside us. And hence, we would not have any sense of 
ourselves as subjects, who can hold beliefs and make judgements 
about this external world. So, Kant concludes, there must be a rule 
of causality, which enables us to so order our experience. For there 
is, he claims, 'nothing in the appearance which so determines it 
that a certain sequence is rendered objectively necessary' 
(A194/B240); and if there is nothing in the appearances 
themselves, but we do have the capacity to experience the world 
and make judgements concerning it, then such a rule must exist, 
and we can know this a priori'.
I render my subjective synthesis of apprehension objective 
only by reference to a rule in accordance with which the 
appearances in their succession, that is, as they happen, are
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determined by the preceding state. The experience of an 
event [i.e. of anything as happening] is itself possible only 
on this assumption. (A195/B240)
Is  Kant a Relativist?
However, there remains Rovane's criticism of Kant's whole program 
— that, as she claims, we are only ever aware not of objects in the 
world, but of mental items, the appearances, in our minds; and that 
this idealism leaves us in the hands of the sceptic. This is a 
commonly-held view of Kant; he is often regarded as claiming, 
particularly in his claim that we can never know objects as they are 
in themselves, and that our understanding is brought to bear on 
appearances, that we can only have certain knowledge of mental 
entities — or that because all we have direct knowledge of is these 
appearances, we cannot be sure that there are any external 
objects. If  this is correct, then it is wrong to claim that there are 
essential similarities between Kant's anti-sceptical argument and 
Davidson's. Kant is no further forward than the empiricists he 
sought to refute, and we are left with the idea that only the 
rejection of the claim that we have any conceptual scheme at all 
will restore us into a direct relationship with the external world.
The Second Analogy, however, is interesting not just for its 
similarity to Davidson's triangle in its function, but also for its giving 
a clear demonstration of the falsity of such interpretation's of Kant's 
epistemology. Rovane writes that he 'never escapes the empiricist 
framework', and that his position entails that 'the notion of 
objectivity provided by the understanding must be restricted to the
63
realm of appearance/ (p. 421) Let's put this view together with that 
which motivates the Second Analogy. Are the two even similar? I 
don't think so.
Kant's move, brought out best, perhaps, by the Second Analogy, 
but recurrent throughout the Critique, is to contrast repeatedly the 
subjective with the objective. While it is true to say that he argues 
our knowledge of the world is achieved through the understanding 
being brought to bear on the material given via the faculty of 
sensibility, it is surely equally apparent that he does not mean this 
to imply that we have no certain knowledge of objects in the world, 
and therefore that he holds the Cartesian, idealist view, that what 
we have immediate knowledge of is mental content. Kant talks of 
'appearances' of objects, but in no way does he imagine that these 
are objects existing only within our minds. He is at great pains, 
indeed, to distance himself form such idealistic views, most 
obviously in the Refutation of Idealism but also throughout the 
Critique, where he continually contrasts the merely subjective with 
the objective.
In the Second Analogy, then, his argument is based upon our being 
able to have knowledge of something that is not just 'in our minds'; 
the boat is an externally existing object, moving on the water and 
generating our impressions of it. While we do receive these 
intuitions of the boat through our senses, as it appears to us, at no 
time does Kant claim that what we are really aware of is not an 
external object, but a mere mental appearance, with no way of our 
knowing if it relates to anything 'outside' at all. His intention in the 
Second Analogy is to uncover, given that we are able to distinguish
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what is subjective from what is objective, just how it is that we do 
so. For we clearly do know that what we are experiencing through 
our senses is an objectively-existing world, where things are 
connected and inter-related in a particular way — this is how we 
come to conceive of ourselves as making judgements, and forming 
beliefs. Unlike the empiricists, who supposed that, as there was 
nothing we could experience through our senses in the objects 
themselves to justify our apparent knowledge of them, then we 
could not be sure that they existed at all, Kant never doubts that 
they are there, and that we know they are. If  this were not so, we 
could have no concept of ourselves as subjects. So he asks — if 
there is nothing in the objects themselves to reveal certain 
knowledge of them to us, how is it that we can have this 
knowledge, that they can become objects for us? And he finds his 
answer in the forms of space and time, and in the categories. He 
does not limit his enquiry to what can come though our senses, and 
indeed it would not make sense to look there, because to have 
experience at all will depend on these conditions. He thus avoids 
the empiricist's result of falling either into what he calls problematic 
idealism, exemplified by Descartes, who claimed that all we could 
be certain of was the mental appearances; or the dogmatic idealism 
of Berkeley, who believed that all our knowledge was really just 
knowledge of appearances, and that nothing else could exist. 
(B274-5)
Another source of the criticism of Kant as being, at heart, an 
idealist, is the erroneous idea that he considers our sensory 
knowledge as being somehow inferior to God's intellectual intuition. 
But nowhere does Kant say this. For one thing, we cannot know
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that God does exist, but even if we could, this would not lead Kant 
to draw such a conclusion. The intellectual intuition can grasp 
objects without need of intuitions, and concepts to synthesise and 
organise those intuitions, but to call knowledge so arising somehow 
superior or more truthful is quite unwarranted. As there is no way 
for us to have knowledge, other than through the kind of intuition 
that we do have, the question of which might be 'superior' sounds 
misplaced. Better to say, in the context of the Critique, that the 
forms of intuition are different, rather than that one is superior to 
the other. To say otherwise is to presuppose the sceptical, and 
perhaps Cartesian-influenced view, that all knowledge which comes 
though the senses is suspect and not to be trusted; that there is 
somewhere an alternative, more reliable source of knowledge for 
us; and that we can only be assured of knowledge of our mental 
contents. Kant's view is that we can have knowledge of an 
independently-existing world, in the form which is available to us, 
which is through our senses.
But what about Rovane's claim that, in invoking the idea of an 
intellectual intuition at all, Kant is opening up the field to 
relativism? Here, after all, are two conceptual schemes, are there 
not? We even have provided the appropriate claim, that two 
schemes are incommensurable, where Kant stresses that, although 
we can conceive of God's intuition as being different from our own, 
we can in no way imagine what it would be like to have that kind of 
knowledge. In with this is linked Kant's famous claim that we can 
only know objects as they appear to us, and never as God does (if 
he exists) as they are in themselves. While this might seem to 
suggest that our knowledge is only of appearances, and therefore
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inferior, there seems no reason to dispute the more common-sense 
— and appropriate-to-the-Cr/t/gae view — that, when he claims we 
can only know objects as they appear, he is making the point that 
without our sensibility, we cannot know them at all. This is a view 
that seems relatively uncontroversial, as all Kant is saying here is 
that we have knowledge of objects, but that, in knowing them, they 
will appear to us in a certain way; and, because we are sensory 
creatures, there are certain conditions under which they will 
appear. Our knowledge is constrained by these conditions — we 
cannot go beyond them and have experience in any other way. It  is 
a conceptual scheme, then, but a necessary one — there are no 
alternatives for us.
Does this then open up the possibility of different conceptual 
schemes, and therefore of relativism? Kant is most insistent on the 
necessity of the scheme, but it was a central point of Davidson's 
paper that the very idea of our establishing that, for us to make 
sense of there being any conceptual scheme at all, we would need 
to have a second type of scheme to serve as a comparison. 
Otherwise, how do we know that there is anything there at all? It  
looks like mere dogma to claim that there is. The entire enterprise 
then begins to look implausible, as, as Davidson points out, 
immediately we are in a position to recognise a scheme as being 
'different' to our own, we have undermined that finding because we 
have shown that we can interpret the other's language (or whatever 
it is we take it to be that their conceptual scheme is manifested in). 
To find a contrasting scheme, we must interpret, but to interpret, 
we must be in a broadly similarly-experienced world. And from this,
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Davidson concludes, we have no grounds for ascribing to ourselves 
any conceptual scheme at all.
Kant's position, however, is quite different. He does take note of a 
possible, different conceptual scheme, but unlike Whorf, and Kuhn, 
makes no attempt to imagine — let alone describe — its 
metaphysics, because he believes that to be quite impossible. As 
humans, with our own conceptual scheme, we cannot conceive of 
what knowledge attained through another conceptual scheme would 
be like. While we can make sense of the idea of ourselves 
possessing a scheme, because we know we are sensory creatures 
with fixed ways of acquiring knowledge, and, further, imagine that 
a being not dependent on senses will receive a different form of 
knowledge, to have any idea of the knowledge so attained is quite 
beyond our reach. And this is no more than what we would expect, 
considering that we talking here of two different, incommensurable, 
conceptual schemes.
If  we resist approaching Kant from a Cartesian-influenced 
perspective, and allow that his position is that of, as he says, an 
empirical realist not'empirical idealist', then we put ourselves in an 
anti-sceptical position of immediately grasping objects in the world 
in the way they appear to us. This now sounds much more like a 
Davidsonian position. Kant then of course goes on to look at the 
conditions upon our so grasping and interpreting our environment. 
This introduces the prospect of Davidson's argument not just not 
being in conflict with the Kantian view, but actually being 
strengthened by it, with Kant demonstrating how finite beings, who 
are not therefore perfectly rational, can come to have knowledge of
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an external world. While Davidson focuses upon language, and our 
ability to interpret and the associated ascription of belief, 
nonetheless part of his picture consists of a shared world. Given 
that we are finite beings, the Kantian argument of how knowledge 
of this world is possible for us might seem preferable, as we cannot, 
as will be discussed in the next section, depend on our limited 
rationality to generate the required necessity in our experience of 
the world.
Davidson's stated view is that we don't have any conceptual 
scheme at all. Any different conceptual schemes would simply block 
— or at least hinder — our success at communication; and given 
that we have no way to make sense of the claim that there are 
different schemes, he concludes that we have no way of knowing 
that there is any such thing at all. But Kant shows us that we can 
make sense of the claim that there might be a different conceptual 
scheme — even if we (necessarily) cannot know how things would 
appear to us under such a scheme — at just the level required for 
suggesting that we do have a conceptual scheme. That is, we have 
a comparison, which is all that was required, without the absurdity 
of our beincj{to interpret the other scheme through our own, and 
this suggests that we might be correct in thinking of ourselves as 
possessing a conceptual scheme, insofar as we are sensory beings. 
Further, there is the inherent plausibility of Kant's claim, that we 
are a part of this world and to have conscious thought must 
somehow be able to interpret it and make sense of it from the 
jumble which comes through our senses. How to even begin to 
triangulate otherwise? And there is no danger of radical 
interpretation failing, and of the world, as it were, fragmenting,
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because our conceptual scheme is shared -not surprisingly, given 
the transcendental nature of Kant's claims — just as Davidson 
insists the world must be shared and that we are all (potentially) 
able to interpret one another. The idea of unity, of a shared 
environment with no deviations form it, is thus retained. We have a 
conceptual scheme, but still communicate — our concept of 
objectivity is thus assured.
While many of Kant's individual arguments for the existence of 
space and time as the pure forms of our intuition, and the 
categories, are regarded as seriously flawed by many 
commentators, put in context the overall picture is much stronger.
Like Davidson, the ultimate force of his position is contained in the 
idea of us all, as humans, being much the same, taking centre- 
stage; we share a way of approaching our environment, and that 
environment is itself a shared one, and we are also all essentially 
rational. Kant's approach to the problem of how we come to have 
knowledge does not, therefore, either contradict vyifehr Davidson's *  
attack on there being different conceptual schemes, or introduce 
the possibility of relativism. Further, we might see Davidson's 
attack on the idea of there being different conceptual schemes as 
an alternative way of arguing for Kant's view that the a priori 
conditions on our knowledge are the only possible ones for 




The idea of there only being one space and time for us, within 
which all our knowledge can and must occur, is of the utmost 
importance for Kant's theory of knowledge. Without it, he argues, 
we could know nothing at all — no experience of any kind would be 
possible. In particular, we could not have any knowledge of 
ourselves as subjects experiencing an objectively-existing world, as 
the world would then be as fluctuating and unpredictable as our 
own disjointed and fragmented impressions, which we experience in 
our own minds, and which have no necessary order to bind them 
together. We need the contrast, brought out most forcefully in the 
Second Analogy, between what is necessary, and thus outwith our 
control and objective, and what is merely subjective, impressions 
would might have come in another order entirely, the choice being 
down to us. This contrast can only come through the observance of 
the necessity inherent in the external world; therefore, Kant 
reasons, given that we do indeed undergo experience, and are able 
to form judgements — the concept of the T  — that is, subjectivity 
— being central to this process — then it must be that the world is 
bound by necessary connections, cause and effect; and that there is 
therefore a unified space and time, for there simply are no choices, 
no other outcomes, of which we could have knowledge and which 
would constitute a different world. The idea of necessity implies a 
single spatio-temporal framework; in an important sense, for Kant 
there are no 'possible worlds'.
In this light, then, it is profitable to compare this strong viewpoint 
with today's debate on our modal thought.
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In discussions of modality, it has been traditional to draw a 
distinction between modality de re and modality de dicto. This is a 
distinction which can be traced back to Medieval philosophy, and, 
very roughly, it can be outlined as follows: modality de re ascribes 
a certain property to an object, whereas modality de dicto ascribes 
a certain property to a statement or proposition.
The trend in recent decades has been very much towards the 
former. This is not surprising, as the resurgence of interest in 
modality can be seen as a direct result of the work done in the field 
of modal logic, where we find the employment of the modal 
operators necessity and possibility. That these modal terms operate 
on objects, as opposed to propositions, leads us into the realm of 
modality de re. This has consequences for our conception of 
essence, as the concepts of modality and essence are closely 
related. For if we speak of a property as being essential to 
something, what we are saying is that it is necessary that it has 
that property, if it is to be the thing that it is. Whereas, if we regard 
a property as non-essential to something which has it — an 
'accident' — what we are saying is that we can conceive of them as 
existing, minus that property.
Lewis's Approach
We are accustomed to assessing modal claims in terms of what is 
the case in all possible worlds; if something is a necessary truth, 
then we understand it as being something which is true in all 
possible worlds, while for something to be possible is for it to be 
true only in some possible worlds. This conception allows our modal
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logic to become a powerful tool in examining and exploring various 
concepts and arguments. In David Lewis's words, it opens up a 
'philosopher's Paradise', (Lewis, 1986, p. 1) in a similar way to how 
the use of set theory created a paradise for the mathematicians. 
But, as ever, this comes at a price, for when we scratch the surface 
— perhaps even before we scratch the surface — a welter of 
difficulties, in particular regarding counter-intuitive consequences of 
the method, emerge.
The metaphysical complications of the theory become immediately 
apparent when we ask the de re proponent the following question: 
how does he resolve the apparent contradiction in his requiring the 
existence of things that do not exist? For this is what it is to be a 
possible world — merely possible, not actually existing. But the 
theory operates by attributing properties to these non-existent 
entities, in its account of the notions of possibility and necessity.
So, how are we to interpret these claims?
There are two main approaches to this problem, the actualist and 
the possibilist. The actualist argues that the difficulty disappears 
when we recognise that there are two senses of the term 'possible 
world' being employed here. Firstly, it is being understood as 
stating that there are various ways the world might be, states of 
affairs which might have existed, and in this sense there very 
clearly are 'possible worlds'; to say so does not seem problematic at 
all. The other meaning is that it might refer to a world which 
literally does exist, in concrete form, but in the actualist view this 
existence applies only to our own world.
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The alternative, possibilist position is exemplified by Lewis. Here, 
the division is made in the area of the modal term's application, 
where we can take it to range over what is actual — namely, our 
own world — but also over all of reality, which includes the possible 
worlds. On this view, the possible worlds really do exist, but are 
removed from us in time and space, so in the actual realm, they 
can be correctly described as not existing.
There are clear difficulties with the metaphysics of both possible 
solutions. The first solution seems somehow 'messy', with no real 
answer being given as to the problem of what a possible world /s; 
possible worlds seem to have disappeared into talk of what is and 
isn't possible, whereas surely our original aim was to explore what 
lay behind the modal concepts of necessity and possibility, and 
demonstrate what made them true or false of certain objects or 
states of affairs. It  seems to be saying that possible worlds are 
possible, and nothing more.
Lewis's response would seem to be arguing that we can talk 
meaningfully of entities, which clearly would have to be, if he is 
right, infinite in number, of which we can have no experience, as 
they are separated from us in space and time. How, then, can we 
know that they exist? And, of course, it is not just that we know 
that they exist, but we know in infinite detail their contents, all of 
their objects with all of their properties, such that they inform all of 
our statements of possibility and necessity. In this respect, we have 
ended up with a much more complicated and difficult notion than 
that which we sought to understand to begin with, which might
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suggest to us that there is something wrong here. For Lewis, 
however, this is the right path to go down; he claims that:
If  we want the theoretical benefits that talk of possibillia 
brings, the most straightforward way to gain honest title to 
them is to accept such talk as the literal truth. It  is my view 
that the price is right... The benefits are worth their 
ontological cost. Modal realism is fruitful; that gives us good 
reason to believe that it is true. (p. 4)
He describes the logical space generated by these possible worlds 
as a 'philosopher's paradise'. His ascription of literal existence to 
these worlds certainly avoids the obvious circularity of the former 
(actualist) approach, while yet retaining the advantages of 
illuminating the logic that underlies our talk of modality. Lewis 
believes that the benefit of being able to economically account for 
our notions of necessity, possibility, essence, and consistency, for 
example, far outweighs the ontological cost of these worlds' 
existing. Furthermore, this in itself is a good reason for him to 
believe that this theory is true.
The most immediate difficulty, I would argue, lies in the 
epistemology of this theory. How, exactly, are we supposed to be 
able to acquire knowledge of these worlds with which, by definition, 
we can have no actual acquaintance? Lewis's response is to draw a 
parallel with the field of mathematics (p. 108). Just as, in 
mathematics, we draw on our knowledge of a whole host of 
abstract objects to inform our statements, so with modal 
statements. He reminds us of Benacerraf's dilemma: we would like
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an account of mathematical knowledge that parallels that of our 
semantics for a natural language. However, this seems unlikely, as 
there are countless mathematical objects, such as the sets of set 
theory, which are not open to inspection, and therefore 'beyond the 
reach of the better understood means of human cognition (e.g. 
sense perception and the lik e )/ (Benacerraf; quoted p. 109 Lewis.) 
So to attribute truth conditions according to these objects opens up 
the mystery of how we can know them when we aren't, it seems, 
acquainted with them, while to attempt a different account leaves it 
a mystery as to where the truth values of mathematical statements 
comes from at all.
For Lewis, 'it is very plain which horn of Benacerraf's dilemma to 
prefer.' (p. 109) It's the epistemologist's problem if he can't 
understand it; for after all, isn't mathematical knowledge much 
more useful to us than the epistemology which here seeks to 
undermine it? It  would be 'hubris' (p. 109), he contends, to take 
their being baffled as a reason to reform maths, in order to 
demonstrate our knowledge of its truths. For Lewis, that something 
is beneficial is reason enough to regard it as true; therefore, it 
really doesn't matter what epistemological difficulties there might 
be, or how strange the relevant ontology seems, because we know, 
independently of any strategy which they might introduce, that our 
mathematical knowledge is true and correct.
And this is what Lewis wants to say about possibillia. The 
'ontological cost' (p. 4) and accompanying epistemological problems 
are irrelevant to its truth; and if we're really so worried about 'how 
we know', then look at maths — aren't we willing, there, to accept
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that we have knowledge of objects with which we have no direct 
acquaintance? Perhaps we are; intuitively, we operate on the basis 
that we are dealing with 'real' objects when we assign truth 
conditions to our mathematical statements, even though, as 
abstract objects, we can have no direct sensory acquaintance of 
them. But surely we would hesitate to do the same regarding items 
such as (to take Lewis's favourite example) talking donkeys, (p. 
108)
There is an obvious difference in that natural numbers, sets, and so 
on, are accepted as being abstract objects; maybe we don't know 
quite how we come to have knowledge of them, but it doesn't 
surprise us too much that they can't be known in the same way 
that we know of physical, concrete entities. But the whole point of 
Lewis's argument is that his possible worlds exist as fully as our 
own. These are concrete, physical objects, of which he asserts we 
have full but mysteriously-acquired knowledge. So on the one hand, 
we have physical objects, which we know through, for example, 
sensory perception, and on the other, we have the possible objects 
in the other worlds, which exist as fully, are essentially 'the same', 
and yet are known in a completely other way! What fixes this 
asymmetry? In maths, it is clear: we can justify it by our appeal to 
the abstract nature of the mathematical objects. What is Lewis 
going to appeal to?
His response is to divide our knowledge into necessary and 
contingent knowledge. Taking the example of a talking donkey, 
which, he claims, we know to possibly exist, he argues that we 
clearly possess such 'abundant modal knowledge', (p. 108) He
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moves from this assertion to the claim that what we need, then, is 
a comprehensive theory that includes this knowledge which, 
although we might not know how, we clearly do have. Our 
necessary knowledge then comprises all our knowledge of 
mathematical objects, and the possible worlds with their various 
members. We have this knowledge a priori, without the need of any 
observation — obviously, because we can't observe it. Our 
contingent knowledge is that which depends on our experience, and 
it is the knowledge of our own world, with which we interact and 
observe. This is where Lewis finds his division between the donkeys 
in our world and the donkeys in the possible ones; and we discover 
which world is actual, which is the one inhabited by us, through 
observation.
Again, however, the distinction between the abstract nature of 
mathematical entities and the concrete existence Lewis is ascribing 
to his possibillia remains troubling. We might happily accept that 
mathematical objects are known by us a priori; but to extend this 
to concrete objects in other worlds, seems both counter-intuitive 
and unnecessary. We generally imagine that our knowledge of the 
immediate objects around us is prior to any knowledge of what 
form these things might possibly take, while still remaining 
recognisably the object that they are; we go from the actual to the 
possible. According to Lewis, however, this is not so; he seems to 
suggest that everything starts off as necessary knowledge, of what 
is possible, and then upon this is built the merely contingent 
knowledge of what is actual. We might think that it is our idea of 
what a donkey is that leads us to the conclusion that there might be 
a talking donkey, and that this is gleaned, at least in part, from our
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a posteriori knowledge of donkeys. But Lewis has it that we survey 
all the donkeys in all the possible worlds, to establish what 
properties they might have, and which are necessary and which 
contingent; and that through observation of donkeys around us we 
establish which of these are actual. Do we really possess such 
knowledge? And even if we do, is this how our knowledge works, 
that knowledge of possible donkeys is in a sense prior to the 
apparently more straightforward knowledge of the donkeys around 
us?
Further, not only does Lewis seem to be wrong about the source of 
our modal knowledge, his possibillia do not seem to be necessary 
for our understanding of modal concepts. The traditional, 
Aristotelian model explicates de re modality without recourse to the 
existence of numerous possible worlds, through designating 
contingent properties as accidents and necessary properties as 
essential. Admittedly, this is circular, but it seems much closer to 
how our understanding of and use of modal concepts operates in 
practice than Lewis's model.
Lewis's theory tells us that we need this immensely complex 
knowledge to lie behind our modal concepts. But we seem to 
manage just fine without any such knowledge of possible donkeys 
in other worlds. Modal concepts such as possibility, necessity, 
contingency and so on have always been with us and form an 
intrinsic part of our language and reasoning, but at no point do we 
seem to call upon such a reserve of knowledge to attribute truth 
conditions to our statements; rather, we combine our knowledge of 
actual properties with actual knowledge of possible bearers. Lewis
79
seems so eager to delve into the logic that he has neglected the 
objects which the logic — which is, after all, only a tool — was 
designed to handle in the first place. His possibillia are a neat way 
of accounting for the inferences we make in modal thinking, but it 
does not bear closer examination, and really serves only as a tool 
for exploring certain modal concepts in a limited way. Does this 
aspect constitute a 'philosopher's paradise'? Surely philosophy 
should seek to operate in a much wider field than that served by 
the postulation of possible worlds; we do want to know and want 
philosophy to tell us, perhaps above all, how we know things, and 
why. A philosopher's paradise would be somewhere that addressed 
all these concerns and even united them; putting semantical 
concerns first as Lewis does seems to be a mistake, beyond its 
value as a tool for our understanding of how modal logic operates.
It  can't tell us anything much about this world, and how we 
structure our knowledge of this world, such that we have the 
knowledge that we do; it doesn't tell us anything that we might 
want to know about us, at all. (Unless, I suppose, you already 
agree with Lewis that we have knowledge of infinite possible 
worlds, all existing as concretely as this one, and that our knowing 
this constitutes an essential part of what it is to be human.)
It  doesn't even seem to have divested us of the problem of 
circularity; the notion of'possibility' is required in Lewis's account of 
the other worlds. This operator is still there and hasn't been 
reduced or explained fully; even if he were right about the possible 
worlds existing, pointing to other objects in this way would not 
serve as a definition for how we understand the modal concepts 
such as possibility and necessity; he has not given us an account of
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these ideas, he has just told us which objects they are true of, and 
we knew that already. This can be seen when we consider that the 
question of his justification of necessary knowledge remains. Even if 
he is right about the possibillia, does something being true in all 
possible worlds constitute its being necessary? We talk like this in 
shorthand in philosophy, we say that something is necessary if it is 
true in all possible worlds, but does this fact about different worlds 
justify the modal step to an assertion of absolute necessity? To 
assert that something is true is one thing; to say that it is 
necessarily true, quite another. If  it does not justify the modal step, 
then Lewis still has questions to answer — he hasn't explained 
necessity, and has introduced infinite objects in his attempt — the 
ontological price now looks far too high.
Further, what fixes the boundaries of the possible worlds? Clearly, it 
can't be observation, so how do we know what pertains in each 
world? Where does one world stop and another begin, and might it 
be possible that, somewhere, scientifically contradictory properties 
pertain? For example: might it be possible that there could exist 
water with 3 hydrogen molecules? There is a real uncertainty here, 
which surely would not be the case if we drew upon existing 
possibillia. This example serves to remind us, too, that there are 
grounds for thinking that Lewis is mistaken in his belief — crucial to 
his argument here — that all necessary knowledge is a priori; 
Kripke's argument that such scientific necessities as water's being 
H20 can only be known a posteriori raises serious doubts that Lewis 
is right in seeing the division in our types of knowledge, and 
accordingly in how we might come to know them, where he does. 
Another difficulty is pointed up by Bob Hale. (1997) He points out
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that on Lewis's account of what a possible world is, there must exist 
possible individuals in various of these worlds. But then they would 
have knowledge of the possibillia around them just as we have, not 
of the same objects, but of the objects in our immediate 
surroundings. And this then, in Hale's words, generates a 'yawning 
chasm' (p. 503) between what makes our ordinary modal 
statements true, on Lewis's view, and our knowledge — 'nothing in 
the character of our knowledge could in any discernible way reflect 
the nature of the states of affairs which confer truth upon the 
propositions known.'
Fine's Approach
Kit Fine, in his paper'Essence and Modality', (Fine, 1994) argues 
that it must always be a mistake to attempt to reduce the concept 
of essence to that of necessity, and therefore that we should revise 
our metaphysical concepts accordingly. He begins by arguing for a 
de dicto form of modality, which he contends will place things the 
right way round. And this is something which feels 'wrong' about 
Lewis's account — the idea that we start from the abstract, and 
then go to the particular, actual, object; or from the possible, to the 
necessary, where necessity ceases to be something of utmost 
importance and interest, and is reduced rather to a particular kind 
of possiblity.
His central point is that:
The notion of essence which is of central importance to the
metaphysics of identity is not to be understood in modal
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terms or even to be regarded as extensionally equivalent to 
a modal notion. ... one notion is... a highly refined version of 
the other; it is like a sieve which performs a similar function 
but with a much finer mesh. (p. 3)
If  he is right, then it is not only the epistemology of Lewis's account 
which is troubling; he has paid the ontological cost, and not even 
secured a comprehensive modal theory.
Fine begins by demonstrating the intuitive appeal of his position, 
against, as he sees it, the suspicious character of the de re account. 
He notes that we have an everyday, accepted way of talking of 
essence: 'We say "the object must have that property if it is to be 
the object that it is".' (p. 4) Now, the various de re options seem 
not to explain the significance which we feel is inherent in the 
claim, 'if it is to be the object that it is.' What Fine refers to as the 
categorical account — which states that an object has a property 
essentially just in case it is necessary that the object has that 
property — makes the phrase redundant and empty, in which case, 
why is it given? The two conditional accounts — the first, which 
makes the necessary possession of the property dependent on 
existence, and the second, which makes it conditional upon identity 
(the object has the property essentially just in case it is necessary 
that the object has the property if it is identical to that very object) 
— seem to fare little better. On the existence view, the phrase is 
regarded as expressing that existence, which seems to make it 
more promising. But then, asks Fine, 'why is the existence of the 
object expressed so perversely in terms of identity?' (p. 4) And
83
because our significant phrase is one concerning identity, the 
identity-conditional account renders it redundant.
All of this, while not amounting to an actual argument against the 
reduction of essence to some form of modality de re, does indeed 
suggest that there is something wrong with that way of thinking, 
and thus motivates our searching for an alternative account.
Fine goes on to argue that the criterion given in the standard 
accounts is necessary, but not sufficient. While it is the case that if 
an object has a property essentially, then it has it necessarily, it is 
not true to say that for an object to have a property necessarily it 
has it essentially. (Here we can find the notion captured by the 
additional phrase, 'if it is to be the object that it is.') Focussing on 
the conditional-existence account, he considers the example of 
Socrates' necessarily belonging to the singleton Socrates. While it is 
certainly the case that this is a necessary proposition, would we 
want to call it an essential property of Socrates? The criterion under 
consideration claims that it is, for, if Socrates exists, then any 
property necessary to him must be essential — to put it in another 
way, there is no possible world in which it could be otherwise. But, 
says Fine, 'intuitively, this is not so. It  is no part of the essence of 
Socrates to belong to the singleton.' (p. 4-5)
The force of Fine's point here can be brought out more fully by 
contrasting the claim that Socrates essentially belongs to the 
singleton Socrates, with the claim that the singleton Socrates 
essentially has Socrates as its member. The latter seems to hold, 
uncontroversially — returning to our earlier, informal notion of
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essence, it is what it is to be the singleton Socrates, to have 
Socrates as a member. There is then an asymmetrical relation 
between the two propositions. However, de re modality, referring 
as it does to the objects, and not propositions, can draw no such 
distinction between the two cases; if Socrates exists and has the 
necessary property of belonging to the singleton Socrates, then on 
its account of essence it must conclude that he has this property 
essentially.
Similarly, if we take any necessary truth at all, such as '2 + 2 = 4 ', or 
even the conjunction of all necessary truths, then clearly it is the 
case that, if Socrates exists, then it is necessary that 2 + 2 = 4 , or 
that all necessary truths are true. But, argues Fine, 'it is no part of 
Socrates' essence that there may be infinitely many prime 
numbers... or what have you' (p. 5). Further, it follows that, 
because any statement of essence is a statement of necessity, it 
becomes true that the essence of any object (Socrates, say) is 
formed in part by the essence of every other. Bizarrely, this means 
that the essence of the Eiffel Tower — being a necessary truth — 
constitutes part of Socrates' essence. So it is a part of his essence 
that the Eiffel Tower is essentially spatio-temporally continuous. '0  
happy metaphysician! For in discovering the nature of one thing, he 
thereby discovers the nature of all things.' (p. 6)
Thus, the account given of the standard phrase by the categorical 
form is too weak, and our alternative, the conditional account, while 
giving a more substantive interpretation ends up making it too 
strong. For we can't distinguish between the non-essential 
properties; once we allow existence to be non-essential, many
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others — such as, to take Fine's example, the existence of Socrates' 
parents — will follow, too. Such properties as this are necessary if 
Socrates exists, but not essential to him; the conditional account 
seems to make all such attributes essential. Anything we could say 
is necessarily true about Socrates, becomes a part of his essence.
One way round this, for the upholder of de re modality, would be to 
introduce a condition of relevance for any property to constitute a 
subject's essence. But all that this does is to raise the question: 
how do we know what is relevant? We can only know this by 
presupposing the very concept that we are attempting to reduce — 
that of essence itself. As Fine puts it: 'We want to say that it is 
essential to the singleton to have Socrates as a member, but that it 
is not essential to Socrates to be a member of the singleton. But 
there is nothing in the "logic" of the situation to justify an 
asymmetric judgement of relevance; the difference lies entirely in 
the nature of the objects in question.' (p. 7) In other words, it lies 
in their essence. On the de re account, then, there seems to be no 
way of avoiding the conclusion that we must assume the concept of 
essence in order to group together the properties which we regard 
as properly belonging to that object.
Fine argues from this to his claim that, rather than, as the de re 
proponent would have it, essence being a special case of 
metaphysical necessity, metaphysical necessity is a special case of 
essence, namely, those properties which are true 'in virtue of the 
nature of all objects whatever.' (p. 9) We need the source-sensitive 
notion of essence to draw the distinctions which the logic of de re 
modality fails to do, for example, as in the case of the singleton
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Socrates having Socrates' existence as part of its essence, while 
Socrates does not have the existence of the singleton as a part of 
his.
Fine attempts to give an account of his alternative, source-sensitive 
de dicto modality, by way of a comparison between the concepts of 
necessity and analyticity, and those of essence and meaning. The 
suggestion of such a parallel — 'as essence is to necessity, so is 
meaning to analyticity' (p. 10) — is implied in the very notion of de 
dicto modality, concerning as it does attributions made not to 
objects, but to propositions or definitions. Fine goes on to give his 
account of essence in terms of its alleged relation to the concept of 
definition.
Thus, we can take a familiar example of an analytic statement, 'All 
bachelors are unmarried m en / and assert that this is necessarily 
true; it is so in virtue of the meanings of 'bachelor' and 'unmarried 
man'. Fine then goes further. He argues that we can draw a 
distinction between this basic notion of what it is for something to 
be analytic, and a deeper, object-sensitive, more finely-grained 
notion. He refers to this process as 'relativizing analyticity'. (p. 10) 
Thus, we can say that the above statement is analytic in the sense 
of'bachelor', for, when we analyse that term, and extract its 
definition, we find the concept of'unmarried man'; whereas, if we 
take the words 'unmarried' and 'man', we find that the sentence is 
not analytic relative to them — when we analyse them, nowhere do 
we find therein the concept of bachelorhood. In other words, it does 
not constitute part of their definitions. One is contained within the 
other, but not the other way around. And here is our parallel — a
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necessary truth may be true in virtue of the identity of certain 
objects as opposed to others, just as an analytic truth can be true 
in virtue of the meaning of certain words and not others in the 
statement.
He regards the objection that the above sentence is in fact equally 
true in virtue of'm an ' and 'unmarried', where 'man' is taken to 
contain 'bachelor or married' within its definition, and so on — as 
implausible. He writes, ' I t  seems quite clear to me, for example, 
that the concept of marital status is not at all involved in the 
concept of being a man.' (p. 10-1) And, even if we do disagree with 
him here, 'the important issue concerns intelligibility rather than 
truth' (p. 11), and his notion of relativized analyticity has been 
made to sound intelligible — certainly in comparison with the idea 
of'm an'defined as being 'unmarried or married.'This reminds us of 
the earlier discussion as to the distinction between necessary truth 
and essence; it is the case that a man must be unmarried or 
married, but this truth does not constitute, for us, a part of a man's 
essence; and it does not constitute a part of the definition of'm an' 
either.
Further, we can agree on the analytic facts, while yet disagreeing 
on facts about meaning, just as, Fine argues, we might agree on 
the modal facts and disagree on the essentialist ones: 'These 
considerations... suggest that even when all questions of analyticity 
have been resolved, real issues as to their source will remain. The 
study of semantics is no more exhausted by the claims of 
analyticity than is the metaphysics of identity exhausted by claims 
of necessity.' (p. 12)
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To say that meaning is holistic, and that an analytic truth derives its 
status from its parts being synonyms of each other, is to give no 
more real understanding of what is generating the analyticity of the 
sentence than our account of essence in terms of necessity gave us, 
in demonstrating how we ascribe essential properties. Fine argues 
that we must dig deeper, and so it isn't enough to claim that 'the 
logical derivation of an analytic statement from the definitions of its 
terms constitutes an analysis of that statement' (p. 12) — there is 
something more going on here than mere logical truth, and we are 
reminded of his earlier attack on the reduction of essence to de re 
modality when he adds: 'as far as this conception goes, one might 
as well extract any predicate P from the given analytic statement 
and use the artificial 'definition' above to provide it with a trivial 
pseudo-analysis.'
A real account of analytic truth will be provided if we allow the 
definitional truths which figure in our traditional conception of 
analyticity — where analytic truths are understood in terms of 
definitional truth — to derive their truth status from the meanings 
of the statement's defined terms. This way, 'real content is given to 
the idea of analysis. The given analytic statement is derived from 
definitions which in a significant sense provide one with the 
meanings of the individual items.' (p. 13)
Fine's view is not simply that there is a similarity between defining 
a term and giving the essence of an object, but rather that the two 
'are, at bottom, the same' (p. 13). Synonyms are no good, for the 
reasons given above; so in looking to define a term, we should be
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attempting to do so in a way which tells us what the meaning 
essentially is — thus, in giving a definition, we are giving an 
essence, which, Fine will go on to argue, is not just the essence of 
the meaning of the word, but of the object itself.
His argument is that there is no real reason to see ourselves as 
defining a concept or meaning, and not an object, other than 
having 'some prejudice against real definition' (p. 14). This 
prejudice, then, causes us to veer away from the conclusion which 
Fine is pushing us towards, and feel strongly that we shouldn't 
presume that we are able to give definitions of actual objects 
themselves.
This accusation of'prejudice' in itself, however, is not sufficiently 
persuasive if Fine is to get us to accept the rest of his conclusion. 
After all, his arguments up till now have derived much of their 
power from our intuitions about essence ('...that it is the object that 
it is'), which Fine has made full use of, and to then, at the last, call 
another such intuition a 'prejudice' is at least surprising. His idea 
throughout is that we come to an awareness of what the essence of 
an object is not by following rules of logic but rather by, 
presumably, somehow intuiting or perceiving that property of the 
object which is its essence. Thus, we have some kind of direct 
relationship with that object's essence; and this seems to sit ill with 
his earlier contention that an indication of the deeper status of 
essence, as opposed to necessity, was our ability to disagree on 
some essentialist facts but not others. This does seem to point up 
that essentialist questions cannot be entirely answered by the 
necessary facts; but it also suggests that we are dealing with the
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concepts that we each hold of objects, rather than the objects 
themselves.
This can further be seen when we consider the example Fine has 
chosen to illustrate his point, namely, the natural numbers. Rather 
than defining each natural number in terms of various others, for 
example, '1 ' as 'the successor of O', is it not more reasonable, he 
asks, to define each number independently of others? (p. 14) And 
this does indeed seem plausible. However, these numbers are, of 
course, abstract objects if they are objects at all, and thus 
knowable only 'directly', that is, without our senses. There is here, 
then, a clear case for our not requiring the mediating notion of 
concepts to enable us to talk about those objects; it would be 
superfluous, and there is an economy in defining the numbers 
individually, as distinct objects. They clearly are, unless you 
disagree that they are objects in the first place, not concepts but 
objects; '1 ' is just that, '1 ', there is nothing more which needs to be 
or can be said in giving its essence. But now consider: what of a 
table? Or a person? It  is far from clear, when we turn our attention 
to concrete objects, that we do have the kind of immediate access 
to their essence which Fine is suggesting. And this would certainly 
account for our disagreeing on the essentialist facts as to what 
constitutes, say, a mind or a person. We can talk about objects 
meaningfully, and communicate successfully, but of course all that 
is needed for this is a shared conceptual understanding (which itself 
needn't even be identical) of what it is that we are referring to; no 
agreement of essence, indeed no direct reference to the essence of 
the object itself, is required.
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And here, of course, is where the possible worlds position is 
strongest. This is not surprising; it is motivated by accounting for 
the truth-conditions that attach to our modal statements, and so 
provides exactly what seems to be required here, and no more. We 
can communicate adequately without agreeing on the essentialist 
facts, and the possible worlds account provides a tool that can 
provide just these truth-conditions for our modal statements. But 
Fine has shown that, metaphysically as well as epistemologically, 
we must look further than this theory; while it is not perhaps 
necessary that we always agree upon the essentialist facts, but only 
operate within a shared conceptual realm, the concept of essence 
still underpins and informs all our other modal judgements. It  
therefore remains significant, and demands a theory that explains it 
further.
What is beyond doubt is that the notions of essence, possibility, 
necessity and contingency and so on are used by everyone 
everyday, and it has always been so. You might argue that there 
seems nothing simpler, more natural, to us. You might then feel 
that any account, such as Lewis's, that made things more 
complicated and outlandish than what it is it is trying to explain, 
has to be wrong somewhere. We have all got along fine without 
presupposing Platonic objects, or possibillia; we don't need these 
things to talk to and understand one another. Further, the 
underpinning of our language by these modal concepts, and their 
interrelations with one another, suggests a more fluid approach 
than any which could ever be afforded by the reduction of our 
notions to certain abstract or concrete objects. Something will 
always be lost in that process — there will be something, as Fine so
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convincingly demonstrates, which slips out, or which can t be 
accounted for on pain of circularity. Our most fundamental modal 
concepts simply don't submit to being pinned down and fixed in 
that way.
If  this is correct, we could argue that essence is such a powerful 
concept, it is always a mistake to try to reduce it, and the correct 
place then to locate it is as an epistemological concept within us. 
There, it is, as it were, readily-available and can be utilised at will in 
our thinking and reasoning.
A Kantian Approach
I f  we take the notion of essence to be a priori, inherent in all of our 
thinking and communicating, we are brought to a Kantian view of 
our modal thinking. The various modal operators then become 
dependent upon categories by means of which we understand and 
'sort' the world.
Such an approach is advocated by George Bealer. In his paper, 'The 
Philosophical Limits of Scientific Essentialism' (Bealer, 1987), he 
argues that a form of'circumscribed rationalism' is required if we 
are to make sense of, and justify, our knowledge regarding various 
modal concepts such as necessity and essence. These different 
'categories' enable us to make the distinctions that Lewis argues 
require our having knowledge of possibillia) it answers the 
metaphysical difficulties of that theory while enabling us to account 
for much of our intuitive notions, which so destabilised the Fine 
account.
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Bealer's argument takes as its focus the modal step — perhaps 
more of a leap — which occurs when, in scientific theorising, we 
move from empirical observations of what is true in certain 
observed cases, to conclusions regarding the necessary status of 
these truths, based upon a posteriori knowledge. Contrary to much 
modern philosophical thinking, his view is that the a posteriori 
nature of such necessary knowledge does not lead to the conclusion 
that this knowledge means that scientific knowledge is independent 
of philosophy, or even (what Bealer terms 'global scientific 
essentialisnrT) that all questions of philosophy will ultimately be 
reduced to science, in a similar way to Lewis's reduction of the 
modal notions to talk of possible worlds. Rather, he argues that we 
are dependent on various a priori categories or concepts in making 
our scientific judgements; without these, the crucial modal step to 
necessary truth remains unwarranted.
He begins by reminding us of Kant's assertion that 'Experience 
teaches us that a thing is so and so, but not that it cannot be 
otherwise.' (Kant, 1990; quoted p.290) There is, then, a tradition in 
philosophy that this type of modal knowledge requires a source 
other than experience, and the accompanying thesis that science is 
ultimately dependent on philosophy. However, this has been 
challenged of late by scientific essentialism, which has pointed out 
that certain, scientific necessary truths — for example, that water is 
always H20 — are based on knowledge which is, contrary to Kant's 
contention, a posteriori.
Does this mean that science doesn't need philosophy? No, argues 
Bealer, for the status of philosophy is such that, not only does it not
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reduce to science, but science actually depends upon philosophy.
He thus proceeds to construct a transcendental argument, to show 
that this is so, on the grounds that the scientist still needs to justify 
his modal step from truth to necessary truth. His point is that this 
can only be achieved through a kind of rationalism that he calls 
'natural rationalism' (p. 339). This is a rationalism that, unlike more 
traditional versions, allows it to coexist alongside the doctrine of 
scientific essentialism. Thus, he holds that both rationalism and the 
a posteriori knowledge espoused by scientists is required for the 
establishment of scientific necessary truths.
He discusses, at length, the claim often made by the essentialists 
that intuitions are what justify our claims of necessity. They 
generally concede that philosophy must provide a general 
proposition, somewhere, if their program is to get off the ground; in 
this way, the modal step is facilitated. The ground of this 
philosophical proposition is, they assert, merely an intuition. Bealer 
quotes Kripke in this regard: 'I  think it [intuition] is very heavy 
evidence in favour of anything, myself. I really don't know, in a 
way, what more conclusive evidence one can have about anything.' 
(Kripke, quoted p. 300) And Bealer defines'intuitions'thus: 'non- 
inferential beliefs regarding the applicability of a concept to a 
hypothetical case. Or if intuitions are not strictly identical to such 
beliefs, they are mental states having a strong modal tie with 
them .'These intuitions form a crucial part of the scientific process, 
for example, in telling us that, on Putnam's twin-earth, the 
substance XYZ, while being macroscopically identical to water, is in 
fact not water but 'twater'. Such intuitions lead us to conclude that 
water is necessarily always H20. Bealer asks — what is it that gives
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these intuitions their evidential weight? (p. 301) And it is no good, 
he argues, to turn to the rules of logic, or of our language and logic 
combined, to perform this function; these rules are themselves 
frequently controversial, requiring further argument, using more 
intuitions, in their justification. Further, their simply being classed 
as intuitions isn't sufficient either, for there are many intuitions 
which we wouldn't want to accord evidential status to — gambler's 
hunches, and the like.
Bealer's solution is to distinguish between three types of concept: 
naturalistic concepts, category concepts, and content concepts. 
Naturalistic concepts are those which require a posteriori 
knowledge; they include the concepts of water, heat, tomato, gold, 
and the like. Category and content concepts are those which 
philosophy is primarily concerned with; examples of the former 
include substance, person, compositional stuff, action, reason, and 
so on; content concepts are 'familiar phenomenal qualities' and 
'basic mental relations' (p. 295). (The demarcation of various 
categories reminds us, again, of Kant's approach.) In order to 
retain the status of necessary scientific truths (while also ensuring 
the independent status of philosophy from science) he argues that 
we must impose a two-tier theory, which separates the content and 
category concepts from the naturalistic concepts, thus enabling us 
to treat them differently, allowing that the former group be known 
only a priori, and the latter, a posteriori. There is then no conflict, 
and the evidential status of our intuitions, governed as they are by 
the rational concepts known to us a priori, is assured. Scientific, 
necessary truths can then be seen to draw their modal status from 
the realm of the category and content concepts.
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We can see how this works in the 'twater' example. Here, we know 
that XYZ is not water, because we have a rationalist intuition about 
what Bealer terms the category concept of compositional stuff, 
which tells us that: 'I f  paradigm examples of a compositional stuff 
have a certain complex composition, then items lacking that 
composition would not qualify as samples of the compositional 
stu ff/ (p. 304) This rational intuition, then gives its weight to the 
naturalistic intuition which motivates the conclusion in this 
example.
A second problem discussed by Bealer is that of the origin of ideas. 
Scientific essentialists need to provide an account that does not 
contradict with their thesis, while yet retaining the status of ideas 
within our epistemological framework. Again, there are certain, 
naturalistic ideas that they don't want to say are a priori, but rather 
come to us through experience. So, what is it to possess a 
naturalistic concept?
The accepted answer is that we must stand in some sort of casual 
relation to the items in the world, which belong to those concepts. 
This seems reasonable; however, in another transcendental-type 
argument, Bealer sets out to demonstrate that for such a causal 
account to work, we must already possess the content and category 
concepts. Anything less than this will fail to provide an adequate 
foundation for local scientific essentialism; thus, scientific 
essentialism presupposes natural rationalism.
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The critical difficulty for the scientific essentialist here is that his 
thesis requires that the concepts he employs be determinate — 
ambiguity will not do; we want to say that we have a concept from 
being able to define a particular something, whether that be gold, 
heat, lemon, or whatever. (The alternative, logical-positivist view 
reduces us to merely stipulating what something might mean; there 
is no room for genuine empirical discovery allowed here.) However, 
argues Bealer, concepts which are established through a causal 
chain alone do not give us the necessary determinacy. He writes:
...the act will always be underdetermined (ambiguous) if 
exclusively causal or "externalist" resources are involved.
The thought or reference is determinate only if the person 
employs background category and content concepts. So just 
as in the case of the problem of the evidential status of our 
intuitions, so in the case of the problem of the 
determinateness of our concepts, scientific essentialists will 
be forced to adopt a two-tier theory that separates 
naturalistic concepts from background category and content 
concepts, (p. 308-9)
And, in order to avoid a regress, the only option available for an 
account of how it is we possess these concepts, is natural 
rationalism.
This conclusion 'meshes exactly' (p. 309) with that of the previous, 
intuitions-argument, which for Bealer lends further strong support 
to his position. His answer as to how we possess determinate 
concepts is 'broadly Kantian' (p. 321) — to have a concept is to
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have a mental capacity, like perfect pitch, which is a cognitive 
capacity 'for necessarily making mostly true judgements regarding 
the applicability of the concept to elementary hypothetical cases 
that the person might consider/ In a similarly Kantian vein, he 
regards the mind as a whole, saying that 'a disconnected piece of 
mind is no more possible than a disconnected piece of space; like 
space, a mind comes as an integrated, synthesised w hole/
At first glance, Bealer's division of concepts and two-tier system 
might look somewhat implausible, or at least, messy. Why three? 
Kant had lots, after all — a proliferation of categories. However, it 
becomes clear, particularly as we are taken at length through the 
various alternative positions — traditional rationalism, empiricism, 
Platonism, coherentism — that his position has much appeal. In 
particular, it appears to give an adequate account of how much of 
our naturalistic reasoning operates. For we do want to justify the 
modal step to necessary truth, and we do want to say that science 
is operating with determinate concepts and making genuine 
empirical discoveries when it does redefine these.
Empirical knowledge cannot be enough for this. We need more if we 
are to establish necessary truth, and also, relatedly, if we are to 
have determinate concepts. Empirical observation cannot fix our 
concepts, and it cannot establish necessary truths; if we are to 
avoid Quinean scepticism, we must look for the answer elsewhere.
Bealer's natural rationalism can give the required weight to our 
natural intuitions, and it can also account for our employment of 
particular examples in our reasoning. For what constitutes a
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genuine hypothetical case? When we reason to the establishment 
of a truth, we frequently employ various hypothetical examples in 
order to test our theories, and we know which examples are good 
and valuable, and which are no help at all — which are the ones 
that are metaphysically impossible. But how do we know this? To 
give all examples equal weight will permit the bad examples — for 
example, that a substance XYZ might be water — as well as the 
good ones; it would contradict the scientific essentialist's thesis.
The 'good' examples, the ones which we have intuitions regarding, 
do not contradict scientific essentialism; but, asks Bealer, 'why is 
the cut just here?' Why is it that, when we come to the cases which 
do not contradict essentialism, we have these intuitions that they 
are metaphysically possible, whereas in the other cases, we do not 
have these intuitions? A purely causal account cannot answer this 
question, and so, Bealer suggests, we must turn to natural 
rationalism.
It  is these a priori concepts, with their strong modal tie to the truth, 
which provide the basis for scientific essentialism. Through them, 
we are able, through causal connections, to form our natural 
concepts. They also guide us in our formation of hypothetical cases, 
enabling us to judge which are valid and possible, and which are 
not. Without them, we would be floundering — we would have no 
means, short of stipulation or luck, of establishing any scientific 
necessary facts, and no means of accounting for our according 
certain of our intuitions the status of evidence, and not others.
We can see a parallel here between the global scientific essentialist, 
and the type of modal account typified by Lewis, although it is true
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that Lewis is claiming that our modal knowledge is fundamentally a 
priori, unlike the scientific essentialist. The parallel exists because, 
while Lewis's modal knowledge is a priori, it depends on the 
existence of something more, something external to us, whereas 
Bealer's account does not. Rather, it comes from the supposed 
existence of the possible worlds, and this is like scientific 
essentialism. For what can justify the modal leap from something 
being true, to our being able to claim that it is necessarily true? 
Lewis can give us no adequate answer here, and nor can global 
scientific essentialism. Given that this is so, and given that we do 
operate with certain modal concepts, it seems reasonable to 
conclude that these must somehow come from within us, and that 
our notions of essence and so on are established through the use of 
certain rational concepts, as Bealer suggests.
Fine has argued, contrary to Lewis, that we should take the concept 
of essence to be our most basic modal notion. If  it is to do the work 
he argues that it must, then we have two possibilities, the first 
being that essence is a property of objects, their 'definition' as he 
puts it, which we somehow intuit in knowing that object. However, 
this again is an a posteriori claim. For how do we identify the 
essence of the object? Remember — Fine took the example of 
natural numbers, avoiding the quite different nature of the concrete 
objects, which we might arguably be most interested in. What gives 
us the essence of a person, or a book? What gives these 
experiences their special quality, such that, contrary to our other 
property ascriptions to that object, we categorise this one as 
'essential' and of a different modal status from the others? And we 
can't just say 'experience', that won't provide us with necessary
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knowledge. We look and see that it has a different colour, or that it 
is a certain shape; we also look and see (somehow — Fine says that 
we do know the object) its essence. And yet the latter has the 
power to generate justified necessary truths.
How do we know the definitions of objects? To know the definition 
is, on Fine's account, to know their essence — because essence is, 
on his account, constituted by those properties such that the object 
is the object that it is. But what gives us access to these definitions, 
and enables us to 'relativize' them as Fine suggests? For we are 
able to carve off some properties as being non-essential, while yet 
identifying and retaining what is essential, and this cannot be 
though observation or experience, because this a posteriori 
knowledge cannot justify our ascriptions of necessity.
In asserting that we are able to find what is essential in an object, 
such that this is necessarily true, Fine seems to be doing what he 
criticises the de re modalists for — presupposing what it is he is 
seeking to give an account of. He needs us to have some kind of 
prior concept of essence to account for our carving off properties in 
the way that he implies; we have to 'see' the essence — which is, 
after all, just a bundle of properties such that the thing is the thing 
it is — before knowing which properties constitute our definition.
All of which implies the second alternative answer to our difficulty: 
that this 'essence' is dependent on a faculty which is located within 
us. This account also has the virtue of explaining the central role of 
the modal concepts, in particular the crucial one of essence, in our 
everyday thought, reasoning and language; its fluidity; its
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applicability to any realm to which we care to bring it. It  also 
answers our previous epistemological difficulties, as to how we 
know, and how we are justified in making the modal leap that we 
do.
Bealer's account seems to suggest a good model for an account of 
our modal concepts. While we may not have the direct and intimate 
access to the 'object in itself' which Fine thinks that we do (if we 
did, we might follow the Kantian line that we would then have no 
need of such a classifying concept as 'essence' at all — we would 
know the object as it was — 'in itself' — without it), we can form an 
understanding of its essential properties, and of what might be 
predicated as being possible or not for it, through our use of various 
concepts as Bealer suggests. Our natural concepts, of what it is that 
objects are, do require our experiencing that object, but they 
ultimately derive their determinate status through our employment 
of the a priori
category and content concepts. It  is through these that we know 
which properties to designate as essential, and which not, when we 
formulate our modal ideas about any object. Disagreements about 
the essentialist facts can be attributed to our not having the 
immediate relation to the object required to know it fully; reliant 
upon a combination of our observations of its properties, and our 
various concepts, we might come up with different conclusions. This 
might be because, in certain cases, there are gaps in our knowledge 
— for example, Fine's example of the mind — which allows us to 
attribute various accounts of its essence. More knowledge, and we 
will have more content for our concepts, and more agreement —
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here we see Bealer's natural rationalism in action, a combination of 
the a priori and the a posteriori establishing a necessary truth.
This theory is economical, presupposing no possibillia. We know 
what is possible not because of existing worlds, but rather because 
of the intuitions generated by our concepts and our ability to 
reason; and the strong modal ties of these intuitions to the truth 
accounts for our making the attributions which we do.
Here we find a modern argument, along Kantian lines, suggesting a 
more intuitively plausible approach to our modal thinking. Bealer's 
rationalism is close in spirit to Kant's account of scientific 
knowledge as both synthetic and necessary, with the necessity 
meaning that there is something a priori in each case to generate 
that modal status. However, Kant has deeper reasons for his belief 
that necessity is not tied to any knowledge of possible worlds, and 
hence that certain concepts are found within our thinking a priori; 
and that is his belief that our experience depends on there being 
only one world.
If  we wish to examine Kant's view on how it is that we make 
judgements, and how these judgements are constrained by the a 
priori intuition of time, then we must turn to Kant's account of the 




In the Transcendental Aesthetic, Kant concluded that the form of 
our intuition was governed by the pure intuitions of space and time. 
While, as discussed in the first chapter, his arguments in the 
Aesthetic have varying merit, it is nonetheless the case that we find 
space and time do apply themselves quite naturally to our 
perceptions; Kant's attribution of them as necessary for our 
knowledge thus has a certain intuitive plausibility. The 
Transcendental Analytic is supposed to mirror the process for the 
understanding; however, it is clear from the outset that the task 
that Kant has set himself in this section is much less 
straightforward. There is nothing which immediately presents itself 
to us as a likely contender for the equivalent role of space and time, 
so Kant must not only unearth what he believes to be the necessary 
elements of our understanding, he must also, somehow, persuade 
us that these constitute a comprehensive list and that they also 
truly do apply to our experience. Furthermore, he must explain just 
how these elements go through and organise the material 
presented to the understanding by sensible intuition, such that a 
'thought' can be successfully constructed — this was a task that did 
not arise in the Aesthetic.
To Kant's advantage, however, the idea that there must be 
something a priori present in the understanding which performs this 
function of arranging and giving structure to our thoughts, has 
immediate appeal, particularly when contrasted with the 
deficiencies in the empirical position that only our senses give
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knowledge. Kant seems to be right in denying that this is so — in 
order to see an apple, it is not enough that we receive various 
sensory inputs; we also need to know, somehow, how to organise 
these inputs so that we can think that we are having the experience 
of seeing something, and that the red sensations and the roundness 
and so on go together to give the thought of an apple. And, as Kant 
argues in the Transcendental Deduction, our ability to do this 
cannot possibly arise from experience as Hume suggests, for 
experience itself depends upon the elements already present in our 
understanding. So they must be 'pure' elements, present prior to 
any experience.
The Categories
These pure elements of the understanding Kant entitles the 
categories. The argument where he derives the twelve categories, 
which he considers to be essential for knowledge, is found in the 
part of the Critique known as the Metaphysical Deduction. It  centres 
on the claim that the 'clue' to the categories, at least one of which 
must be present in each and every judgement which we make, can 
be found in the different forms of logical judgement. Kant lists 
twelve of each, arranged in four groups of three, and each one in 
the first, Judgements table, is supposed to correspond with the 
similarly-situated category in his second table. Thus, the twelve 
forms of judgement are: Quantity — universal, particular, singular; 
Quality — affirmative, negative, infinite; Relation — categorical, 
hypothetical, disjunctive; and Modality — problematic, assertoric, 
apodeictic. The twelve categories are as follows: Of Quantity — 
unity, plurality, totality; of Quality — reality, negation, limitation;
Of Relation — inherence and subsistence, causality and
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dependence, community; and Of Modality — possibility- 
impossibility, existence—non-existence, necessity—contingency.
Kant's belief that the table of categories is complete and exhaustive 
resides in his claim that the science of what he calls general (as 
opposed to transcendental) logic has been completed, and that as 
the categories have been derived from the judgement-forms, their 
list must be complete and exhaustive, too. Despite the emphasis he 
places upon the completeness of his table, Kant makes no 
argument for the certainty of the elements of the table of 
judgements — instead, he simply states that the completion of 
general logic is so.
What Kant calls general logic is what we would term formal logic; 
Kant describes it as follows:
Pure general logic has to do, therefore, only with principles a 
priori, and is a canon of understanding and of reason, but 
only in respect of what is formal in their employment, be the 
content what it may, empirical or transcendental.
(A53/B77.)
It  is, then, 'the mere form of thought,' (A54/B78), and it is these 
forms which we find in the table of judgements. Purely formal as it 
is, general logic 'abstracts from all content of knowledge,' 
considering only 'the logical form in the relation of any knowledge 
to other knowledge.' (A55/B79.) The only restrictive principle here 
is that of non-contradiction — providing the two items in the 
judgement do not contradict one another, then we make any
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judgement we choose. Truth, as in, what is or is not so in the 
worid, is not relevant because these purely logical or formal 
judgements take no regard of what is actually the case, or not.
In the Table of Categories, however, we find represented the body 
which Kant calls transcendental logic. Unlike general logic, it does 
not abstract from all content of knowledge, and therefore places 
constraints upon the judgements that we can make. If  something is 
not in agreement with the categories, this is equivalent to stating 
that it is false; Kant points out, however, that no positive criterion 
of truth is possible, as it would have to be both general and apply 
to any number of varied cases of knowledge.
Debate upon the Metaphysical Deduction has frequently focussed 
upon the precise relationship between the two kinds of logic, 
particularly and most interestingly upon whether one might be 
dependent upon (and even reducible to) the other, and if so, which 
one we should regard as being fundamental. While there are very 
obvious objections one might make to the programme of the 
Metaphysical Deduction — for example, that developments in 
modern formal logic indicate that it is hardly complete as Kant 
considers it to be, and nor, if we follow Quine, need it be so certain 
— to focus on these is really to lose sight of much of what is of 
worth within the presentation. A closer, more balanced examination 
of Kant's thought here, particularly if we link it with other 
relevant parts of the Critique, shows the Metaphysical Deduction — 
and especially this division of logic — has much of interest to offer 
us in modern debates upon the nature of logic and modality.
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In the previous chapter on modality, the difficulty of accounting for 
our referring to possible (but non-existing) objects was discussed, 
and various approaches to this problem were examined. Kant's 
approach here is interesting because it involves two types of 
necessity, one given in the Table of Judgements, and the other in 
the Table of Categories. This might give us some hope of 
accounting for the dilemma of how we can account for the possible 
existing, and yet not being actual and therefore not existing in any 
ordinary sense, without recourse to the claim that there are infinite, 
physically-real possible worlds. However, in order for us to be able 
to make this distinction, Kant will again lay claim to various a priori 
elements in our thinking. These constraints will replace the need for 
physically-existing objects, as in Lewis's account. Most obviously, in 
this section of the Critique, this means the categories; but at a 
deeper level, he is arguing that we are dependent upon the unity of 
space and time to be able to apply the categories at all.
Kant's claim is that, while the Table of Judgements relates only to 
analytic knowledge and depends solely upon the principle of non­
contradiction for its application, the categories relate to our 
formation of synthetic knowledge, and therefore to judgements 
involving more than bare logic, judgements which will then have 
further constraints imposed on them. This being the case, for 
knowledge to be attained we require the framework of space, and 
particularly time, and such a framework implies that there be one 
space and one time, that things might find their place in the 
succession and so generate knowledge. Without this a priori 
framework, we would lack the necessary, further constraint on our 
synthetic judgements, which, unlike those that arise from the Table
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of Judgements, are sometimes order-dependent. As Kant has said, 
nothing can be experienced outwith this space and time, and this 
fixed framework guides the application of the categories, just as the 
principle of non-contradiction guides that of the bare judgements.
This asymmetry, or order-dependence, found in certain of the 
categories' applications is crucial to this claim. It  reminds us, too, of 
Fine's attack on the possible-worlds approach to our modal thinking 
— his whole point there was to argue that the asymmetry occurring 
in much of our modal thinking could not possibly be accounted for 
by the order-indifferent 'bare logic' underlying the possible-worlds 
view. The question then arose — how might these constraints be 
generated? Fine's answer was that we have some kind of 
relationship with what we are judging which enables us to just see 
which of its properties are essential (as opposed to the purely 
formal status of being necessary). Kant's response is that the 
necessary unity and uniqueness of our spatio-temporal framework 
is what constrains the application of our categories, and that this 
framework is present in our thinking a priori.
In his paper, 'Concepts, Judgements and Unity in Kant's 
Metaphysical Deduction of the Relational Categories' (Nussbaum, 
1990), Charles Nussbaum picks out this asymmetry as a means to 
give an account of what is special about the Table of Categories 
compared with the Table of Judgements. His paper is largely a 
response to the debate which much of the discussion of the 
Metaphysical Deduction has centred around — if the 'clue' for the 
categories is to be found in each of the corresponding judgements, 
and if, as Kant says, the same function is found in each case, then
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how are they distinct from those judgements such that they might 
be said to hold a significant place in our thinking? And, if we allow 
them to stand apart from the judgements, so that they can 
represent something vital in our thinking, can they then be said to 
be deducible a priori from our understanding?
Charles Nussbaum, taking his lead from an earlier work by Klaus 
Reich, Die Voiistandigkeit der Kantischen Urteilstafel, attempts to 
steer a middle course between these two equally unpalatable 
alternatives. He begins by quoting the passage from the 
Metaphysical Deduction which he believes to be the most 
significant:
The same function which gives unity to the various 
representations in a judgement also gives unity to the mere 
synthesis of various representations in an intuition; and this 
unity... we entitle the pure concept of the understanding/ 
(A79/B105.)
He asks, if the two functions — the one which relates to the 
analytical unity and that which works by means of the synthetic 
unity of the manifold of intuition in general, that is, all that is given 
by intuition and synthesised in the understanding — are the same, 
then how can we begin to distinguish between analytic and 
synthetic judgements?
Some commentators, such as Allison (Allison, 1983), have argued 
that Kant intends us to take it that the same kind of judgement — 
the analytical — is involved in both tables' application; this will,
111
they believe, strengthen the position of Kant in deriving one 
necessarily from the other. However, Nussbaum believes that 
Allison has been helped into this position through his 
misinterpretation of a key sentence of Reich's: 'Necessity of 
'synthesis' as a special act of thought... and knowledge by means of 
general concepts are thus interchangeable concepts.' (Reich, 
quoted p. 92) Allison, he argues, seems to have taken from this the 
idea that synthesis and knowledge by means of general — that is, 
those listed in the table of judgements — concepts is 
interchangeable. But Reich is not saying that at all — he is saying 
the necessity of synthesis is what is interchangeable with 
knowledge by means of general concepts. And this means 
something quite different.
The point here is that, as Nussbaum puts it, the two are 
'indispensable sides of any discursive understanding, and neither 
would be applicable to an understanding that was intuitive.' (p. 92- 
3) Reich is then simply stressing that both are equally important for 
us to have knowledge, and that, if we have one, then we must have 
the other as well. Without the ability to form a synthetic unity, we 
would not be able to have any experience. Without an analytical 
unity, our experience could not be brought before concepts and so 
interpreted, and understood.
The whole point of the Critique is that there are certain things 
necessary for us — humans — to have knowledge, and Kant makes 
the comparison between the limited beings which we are, and the 
intellectual intuition possessed by a perfect being (God). This 
distinction is highly illuminating for Kant's underlying thought in the
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Critique; when it is borne in mind, much of what might otherwise 
be obscure or baffling in his argument is more easily understood — 
for example, the doctrine of phenomena and noumena. It  could be 
seen, indeed, as the essence of his position of transcendental 
idealism. Because we are reliant on our senses for knowledge, we 
cannot immediately grasp objects, but can only know them as they 
appear to us. Only God can know things as they are in themselves, 
and as such has no need whatsoever of concepts to organise his 
impressions, which are gained immediately by his intellect. But we 
must depend upon a synthetic unity, generated by the categories, 
and the forms of judgement which give the analytical unity vital for 
judgements — only then, can we be said to have knowledge. Both 
these steps are vital, both are required for sensible beings such as 
ourselves. And it follows too, then, that these two are not the same 
thing at all, and we can see Kant's establishing of two tables as 
carrying through this theme, of both being necessary for humans to 
have the knowledge which we do.
Further, it is surely most unlikely that Kant wants us to see him as 
saying that it is the same act of thought involved in bringing things 
together via the categories, as it is in constructing judgements 
according to the general logic forms. For the two operations quite 
clearly are different, and it requires little reflection to see that this 
is so. Walsh (Walsh, 1975) brings the point out well, asking us to 
compare the thought processes involved in making the judgement, 
'All hymn books are black,' with that present in thinking, 'There's a 
fast car coming.' He writes:
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The 'analytical unity' (A79/B105) which belongs to such 
representations [in the former example] is not at all like the 
'synthetic unity' which is involved when we identify an object 
on the strength of its various appearances [as in the latter 
example, where] I connect them not as identical instances of 
the same concept, but as different manifestations of the 
same continuing thing. The two operations are totally 
distinct, and to speak of the 'same function' (A79/B104) as 
being involved in both is quite mistaken.' (p. 62)
Walsh then sees Kant as going astray here; however, we might 
argue that Kant meant something quite different as being 'the same 
function', and also that quite clearly he did see a vital distinction 
between the two kinds of thought, which is precisely why he has 
two different tables in the first place.
In unlocking just what Kant did mean, then, in claiming that the 
same function was operating, Nussbaum urges us to make a careful 
distinction between analytic concepts and analytic judgements.
(This is what he believes Allison fails to do.) The sameness of 
function lies in our finding the same basic forms underlying our 
thinking when we abstract from synthetic and analytical 
judgements:
...we have, in the case of the judgements and the categories 
of relation, three basic syntactic forms, in the sense that 
these forms outline the minimal conditions for what we 
might call well-formed judgmental expressions, whether 
these expressions rest on analytical or synthetic functions.
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On this view, the general function of unifying concepts in a 
judgement is the 'same function' referred to by Kant, and 
the 'form of thinking', in the most general sense, is 
judgmental, and only secondarily conceptual. It  is most 
certainly not the form of analytical unity, (p. 95, italics 
added.)
Thus, while Kant calls the categories 'pure concepts', they are, 
argues Nussbaum, better classed as rules of judgement, employed 
when making synthetic judgements. Aside from these formal 
similarities, however, the two processes are quite different, as 
Walsh has shown. There is analytic thinking going on in the 
judgement, 'All hymn books are black', but for us to be able to 
make that judgement we are dependent upon a synthetic unity, 
which has connected all the various impressions of black hymn 
book-objects into a knowledge, an experience, of them, which then 
can be brought to bear on the general concepts and allow us to 
make the judgement. Both are required, but the synthetic unity is 
quite distinct from the analytic, and in fact is presupposed by it. But 
that should not surprise us; for Kant, all such knowledge starts with 
experience.
Asym m etry in Synthetic Judgements
However, a problem remains, for there seems to be a significant 
formal difference between the crucial relational categories, and 
their equivalents in the table of judgement. The difficulty is that, for 
the categories of causality and substance, order matters, whereas 
in the general categories, this is not always so. Logically, any 
concept can be combined in any way with another so long as the
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result is not self-contradictory, but the category of substance, for 
example, demands that the subject of the judgement must always 
function as substratum, and never as an attribute.
Kant makes this distinction himself:
Thus the function of the categorical judgement is that of the 
relation of subject to predicate; for example, 'All bodies are 
divisible'. But as regards the merely logical employment of 
the understanding, it remains undetermined to which of the 
two concepts the function of the subject, and to which the 
function of predicate, is to be assigned. For we can also say, 
'Something divisible is a body'. But when the concept of 
body is brought under the category of substance, it is 
thereby determined that its empirical intuition in experience 
must always be considered as subject and never as mere 
predicate. Similarly with all the other categories. (B129.)
So, Kant is saying that, whenever we assign to something the 
category of substance, and regard it as such, then its place as 
subject is fixed. And Kant is claiming more here than that it is so 
within that particular judgement, made at that moment; again, this 
would be to trivialise the role of all the categories. Rather, he is 
making a fundamental point about the nature of the categories, and 
how they are essentially different from the general concepts, adding 
more to our knowledge, because they are concerned not just with 
form (like the general concepts are) but also with content. This 
empirical element is irrelevant to the logical form of a judgement, 
but in synthetic judgements, it is of the essence, and means the
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arrangement of concepts within a judgement is relevant. This is 
precisely why we need the categories, which take notice of more 
than bare logic, enabling us to make valid synthetic judgements 
about the objective world.
Nussbaum brings out this difference by describing the relation 
between substance and attribute as asymmetrical, while that 
between subject and predicate is symmetrical or order-indifferent, 
(p. 97) With the former, we might also say that there is a direction, 
as in the statement, 'A is north of B / In contrast, there is no 
direction involved in a symmetrical relation — 'A is equal to B' is 
equivalent to 'B is equal to A.' In making this distinction, we give 
ourselves a way to shed some light upon what Nussbaum terms 
Kant's 'dark saying' (p. 97) that the understanding 'introduces a 
transcendental content into its representations, by means of the 
synthetic unity of the manifold in intuition in general.' (A79/B105.)
It  is this 'transcendental content' which provides the extra-logical 
means for our understanding's employment of the categories. 
Without it, we would have nothing more than the general logic, and 
the kind of asymmetric relation apparent in the category of 
substance would be unachievable. Kant's answer as to how the 
understanding can so order its elements, so that they are 
constrained by more than general logic, is that it depends upon the 
pure intuition of time (this is made clear in the Schematicism). 
Nussbaum repeatedly stresses that he (Kant) falls back upon time 
for this role because, in Kant's day, there was no conception of a 
logic of relations which might account for these differences in a 
logical manner. Hence, Kant's assumption that, if it was not
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(general) logic that supplied the extra constraint, then it must arise 
from a pure intuition — which for us is time.
The pure intuition of time, however, seems to occupy too central a 
place within the Critique as a whole for its purpose to be met by 
modern logic. To assert this is to take one's eyes from what is 
Kant's purpose throughout, which is to establish the ultimate 
conditions for our knowledge. Logic — modern or otherwise — 
seems to be limited in what it can explain in this respect. To take 
Nussbaum's own example: he reminds us of Kant's discussion, in 
the Prolegomena, of the problem of the incongruous counterparts. 
The logic of Kant's day provided him with no way to account for the 
distinction which we can make between one hand and the other — 
the right and left are both identical in that respect. Therefore, Kant 
concludes that it must be a pure intuition which provides us with 
the necessary means to this distinction; if he were writing today, 
says Nussbaum, he would simply turn to the logic of relations, and 
assert that we know that one is the opposite of the other. And so 
with the use of time in the Analytic; ample resources exist within 
modern logic to enable Kant to account for the transcendental 
content in our judgements, and the pure intuition of time is only 
turned to out of a lack of a better alternative. This would further be 
to Kant's advantage, he believes, because he has already made a 
huge advance in his philosophy by turning away from ontology, 
which was traditionally regarded as the source to the answer of the 
problem regarding what fixes something as a substance and never 
a property, instead seeking to find it within the sphere of logic: 'The 
proud name of an Ontology that presumptuously claims to supply, 
in systematic doctrinal form synthetic a priori knowledge of things
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in general... must therefore give way to the more modest title of a 
mere Analytic of pure understanding/ (A247/B303.) Such a move 
would then allow Kant to turn fully, as Nussbaum sees it, from 'a 
dogmatic assertion of how things must be, to a defensible assertion 
of how we must think things to be' (p. 99), formalising the 
categorical rules which he instead turns to the field of 
transcendental logic, together with the intuition of time, to 
accomplish. But for Kant, the reason that we cannot look to 
ontology is that we can only ever know things as they appear to us, 
not as they really are; and it is this that leads him to explore the 
conditions of our thought. Kant does not see logic as superior to 
ontology, in the way that Nussbaum's argument seems to imply; 
rather, his abandonment of an ontological approach stems from his 
conviction that we can only know things as they appear to us. This 
emphasis on epistemology leads Kant to explore things at a much 
deeper level — hence his transcendental logic.
The whole point of the pure categories, as Nussbaum himself is at 
pains to point out, is that they concern the synthetic unity in our 
understanding. And this unity, for Kant, is essentially temporal; we 
can think of nothing but in time, all of our perceptions and thoughts 
require the form of time for us to have them at all. This does not 
seem to have much to do with the logic of relations. Kant is not just 
turning to the notion of time for want of a better alternative in the 
field of formal logic; rather, for him, it is what underlies all of our 
representations, and what makes the synthetic unity of 
consciousness possible.
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Kant's priority is surely not finding as many formal (logical) rules 
for our experience as possible. Rather, he is interested in how it is 
we must think things to be, if we are to have knowledge; what it is 
necessary that we have in order, as humans, to have any 
experience at all. As well as the importance of the pure intuition of 
time throughout his argument, its occurrence in various parts of the 
Critique, we might even argue that, for Kant, transcendental logic is 
playing a role which formal logic alone could not. We can see this 
when we look at the sole condition applying to the formation of 
valid judgements in his general logic, non-contradiction. This 
principle is symmetrical and is as simple — indeed the same as — 
the conditions upon basic mathematical equations. It  has nothing to 
do with sensory experience. The conditions attaching to relational 
logic, however, are quite different. The fundamental notion of non­
contradiction cannot guide us in the formation of the asymmetric 
judgements, such as we find in those constructed by the relational 
categories of substance and causality; and those which we find in 
relational logic, such as subordination, seem to presuppose 
something further if we are to employ them in our judgements.
We must remember that Kant is starting from scratch, as it were — 
he wants to look at how we can even construct judgements as to 
what is opposite to what. His response is that we must have 
something within our understanding, something that is both pure 
and extra-logical, in order for us to have any synthesis of our 
understanding. This is the 'transcendental content' to which he 
refers, and the whole point of his transcendental logic. We must 
have some 'transcendental content' if we are to know how to 
subordinate one concept to another — remember, the argument
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given by Nussbaum centred around his observation that the 
relationship here was, in two of the relational categories, fixed — 
and our understanding of the relational logic necessary itself 
requires something already existent in our thinking, such that we 
can apply this division in the first place. Logic might help us to 
express what is going on in such statements, but it does not give 
the slightest clue as to how we perceived that relationship, 
understood the asymmetry, and judged accordingly. Kant's original 
question is — how are synthetic a priori judgements possible?
Which here leads to — what is it that so constrains the order of our 
judgements, establishing these asymmetric relations?
It  is our pure intuition of time that accomplishes this. Here, we see 
all of Kant's ideas as to the nature of time come together, 
particularly when we look beyond the relational categories to those 
of modality. The difference between the fields of general and 
transcendental logic here is at least as striking as that which we 
found in the relational judgement forms and categories, although it 
is, perhaps, less obvious at a purely formal level. Kant makes a 
clear distinction between two kinds of necessity — that found within 
general logic is analytic necessity, but the category of necessity 
cannot be thought about any substance or being itself, but only of 
their attributes, and that in accordance with already-existing 
objects and the principle of causality. Given the role of the temporal 
in our understanding of causality, as is made clear in the Second 
Analogy, we can here see the importance of time as the uniting 
force in our synthetic unity.
The Modal Categories
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Kant argues that the categories of modality are quite different to 
the other three, in that, 'in determining an object, they do not in 
the least enlarge the concept to which they are attached as 
predicates/ Instead, they 'only express the relation of the concept 
to the faculty of knowledge/ (A219/B266.) I f  an object is possible, 
then, 'it is in connection only with the formal conditions of 
experience, and so merely in the understanding... If  it stands in 
connection with perception, that is, with sensation as material 
supplied by the senses, and through perception is determined by 
means of the understanding, the object is actual. If  it is determined 
through the connection of perceptions according to concepts, the 
object is entitled necessary/ (A234/B286-7.) This compares with 
the account of their equivalents in the table of judgements thus — 
the problematic is that which expresses 'only logical (not objective) 
possibility'; while the assertoric 'deals with logical reality or truth.' 
The apodeictic, meanwhile, 'thinks the assertoric as determined by 
these laws of the understanding, and therefore as affirming a priori; 
and in this manner it expresses logical necessity.' (A75-6/B101.) 
With these, purely formal, judgements, Kant describes the mind as 
passing from one to the other in a sequence; we start by 
formulating a possible judgement, which we have a 'free choice' of 
admitting and taking into the understanding, making it assertoric or 
valid. This then might come to be regarded as having analytic 
necessity, if this validity is determined by the laws of the 
understanding, and so could not be otherwise.
Kant wants to make a very clear distinction between these forms of 
judgement — where anything is possible providing it is not 
immediately self-contradictory — and the modal categories. This is,
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at least in part, because of the attack he wishes to make on 
metaphysicians, whose excesses he so abhors; he then places 
severe constraints on what can be counted as possible, actual, or 
necessary in our synthetic thinking, and does this through his 
introduction of the temporal, and the associated idea of a 
permanent substance. Thus, the transcendental content, given in 
time, which Kant regarded as shaping our judgements formed by 
the relational categories, is relied upon even more heavily — and 
certainly more explicitly — in the employment of the categories of 
modality. Here, also, there is a clearer case for the argument that 
no amount of modern logic could capture the notion that Kant is 
after here, as shaping and guiding our judgements of the objects of 
our knowledge. Perhaps because the modal categories are different, 
not adding to our knowledge but rather commenting on it, logic 
cannot serve to account for this ability at all, and we must, if we 
agree with Kant that there are certain necessary conditions of our 
knowledge, which it is the job of the philosopher to uncover, turn to 
something 'pure' and present within our own understanding, to 
accomplish this task.
In his discussion of the modal categories, Kant claims that, while 
anything non-contradictory is 'possible', the application of the 
modal categories generates something quite different, and, as with 
the relational categories, more restrictive. In the Postulates of 
Empirical Thought, Kant writes:
...the principles of modality are nothing but explanations of 
the concepts of possibility, actuality, and necessity, in their 
empirical employment; at the same time they restrict all
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categories to their merely empirical employment, and do not 
approve or allow their transcendental employment. For if 
they are not to have a purely logical significance, analytically 
expressing the form of thought, but are to refer to the 
possibility, actuality, or necessity of things, they must 
concern possible experience and its synthetic unity, in which 
alone objects of knowledge can be g iven / (A 219/B 266-7.)
So we are not here assessing the logical form of judgements, but 
'things', and this means that our modal judgements are shaped and 
restricted by the synthetic unity of the understanding. This forbids 
the kind of wild theorising which the metaphysicians might be 
tempted to employ, because we can only judge what is given to us 
in our experience.
This point is what lies behind Kant's apparently odd claim that there 
is the same amount of possible, actual, and logical things. He 
agrees that formally, we can go from the proposition, 'everything 
actual is possible,' through conversion, to the particular proposition, 
'some possible is actual.' But this does not mean that we can allow 
the number of possible things to exceed that of the actual, for, he 
argues 'this alleged process of adding to the possible [to make it 
actual] I cannot allow. For that which would have to be added to 
the possible, over and above the possible, would be impossible.' 
(A231/B284.) It  is 'impossible' because all that we can add to the 
possible is a 'relation to the understanding', that is, that it is 
something which we can perceive; and such a thing is precisely 
what it is to be actual. So the idea of some thing which exists as 
merely possible, without the connection to our senses which would
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make it actual, makes no sense. As Kant goes on to say, 'without 
material nothing whatever can be thought. What is possible only 
under conditions which themselves are merely possible is not in all 
respects possible/ (A232/B284.) We can reason to ourselves that 
something is logically possible, but we can draw no inferences from 
this to the conclusion that such things are in any way real or 
existent.
Kant's position on this is clarified when we remember his contention 
that all of our intuitions have the form of time, and that there is 
only one time — there are no breaks in it, and no separate, 
disconnected, 'bits'. This means that we can only interpret the 
world, that it only has any meaning for us, if we are able to 
perceive it as occupying one temporal series, with past, present and 
future all being part of this one unified time sequence. Kant's view 
is that knowledge ceases, and descends into chaos, where time is 
allowed to fragment. It  is a necessary condition for our knowledge 
that the pure form of our intuition — time — is one continuous 
series. It  is from this that Kant argues for the existence of the 
substratum — the permanent substance, which can never be 
thought as an attribute — which represents the continual unbroken 
series of time, binding together the synthetic unity while allowing 
us to notice changes within nature. All this means that, for us, 
there can be no possibility of inferring any possible objects, as that 
would entail knowledge of a different temporal unity, which it is 
quite impossible for us to do. There is simply no possibility for 
something's being different to what it is at any one moment in 
time, because of the 'laws of nature' — that 'nothing happens 
through blind chance', and that 'no necessity in nature is blind, but
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always a conditioned and therefore intelligible necessity.' 
(A228/B280.) We perceive the world as unified through the a priori 
principle of causality, held within one temporal framework. 
Everything is bound up together and interconnected with something 
else — nothing stands on its own, just as no piece of time stands on 
its own. It  is because of this unity that we are able to have 
knowledge at all, and it is in this way that Kant can say that there 
are no more necessary objects in the world than actual.
This unity in one time, where we understand the world as one of 
inter-relating objects, is what gives us knowledge, but is also what 
restricts it. Kant's two purposes were to attack the ontological 
excesses of the metaphysicians, and to establish the conditions for 
genuine knowledge; here we see the boundary established through 
both these objectives, beyond which we cannot be said to know 
anything at all. Hence, the restriction of the categories, to that 
which we can experience only, and there being the same number of 
actual and possible things. We can see here also that Kant is not 
merely falling back on time for want of a better logic — rather, it is 
time that shapes the synthetic unity from which all knowledge 
begins. It  is time that orders things, such as in our asymmetrical 
judgements, and restricts them, giving us our transcendental logic. 
Without it, Kant argues, there would simply be no knowledge 
possible, for us as human beings.
This point is argued for by Walsh in his paper, 'Kant on the 
Perception of Time' (Walsh, 1967), where, as discussed in Chapter 
1, he examines the view of time as advanced in the three Analogies 
of Experience. He takes issue with the view, advanced by some
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commentators, that, even if it were possible for a substance to be 
utterly annihilated, so that it no longer existed — or, in terms of the 
Second rather than First Analogy, that an event occurred which 
produced no effect; or if some substance suddenly sprang into 
existence from nowhere — an event without a cause, in other words 
— this would not matter too much. We would still, they argue, 
manage to keep track of our perceptions, and organise them, and 
so be able to distinguish the outer, objective world from our own 
impressions. This is because there is enough stability in the world 
to enable us to order it sufficiently, even if a few isolated events 
like this did occur. This view runs completely counter to the 
transcendental argument that Kant produces, which states that, 
without the unity of one time, experience is impossible; and that 
such annihilation of, or miraculous creation of, substances would 
utterly destroy this unity of time, for 'the appearances would then 
relate to two different times, and existence would flow in two 
parallel streams — which is absurd. There is only one time in which 
all different times must be located, not as coexistent but as in 
necessary succession to one another/ (A 188-9/B 231-2.)
Walsh agrees with Kant that this a priori form of a unified, single 
time is necessary for us to have experience at all. He argues that, if 
we were to start to allow for the odd miraculous occurrence, then 
we would have no way of knowing where we should draw the line — 
how many incidents would count as one too many — and how we 
should draw it. He asks, 'how far must this process go before we 
have to confess ourselves totally baffled?' (p. 392) We would, he 
argues, be faced with two alternatives, if we were to safeguard the 
objective status of (at least some of) our knowledge — to either say
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that anything empirically experienced must be real, no matter how 
'odd' it seemed; or to claim that these oddities were entirely unreal 
— but on what grounds would we make this distinction and justify 
it? Either way seems a muddle. We end up losing the clear line 
between is actual and 'real' and what is, in Kant's phrase 'merely 
possible', or unreal. And, if we follow Kant's line of thought, this has 
the result not only that our ability to interpret the external world is 
lost, but also our ability to distinguish between inner and outer 
impressions, for it is the necessity we see in the objective world — 
the way in which we cannot 'choose' what to perceive, but must 
just see what is there for us to see — that enables us to tell apart 
our inner impressions from our intuitions of an existing world. There 
is a real need, then, for a unified framework according to what Kant 
has called the necessary 'laws of nature.' (A216/B263) Any 
exceptions, and we will have a 'parallel stream' of existence, with, 
as Walsh points out, 'no reason for preferring one over the other'
(p. 393), just as we have no reason for calling one event 'real' and 
another, odd one, not. And, of course, because all our experiences 
must be placed within the framework of one single time, it is in fact 
quite impossible for us to experience such miraculous events in any 
case. Experience, for us as humans, just is as part of one single 
temporal framework, where everything we experience is bound by 
laws of necessity. If  any creation or annihilation was permitted, 
then we would forfeit the necessity involved in the world as it 
appears to us — anything might happen.
It  is the force of this thought that underlies Kant's view of the 
modal categories. The number of actual and possible is of course 
the same, because there is only one 'stream', one time, within
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which we can and in fact do experience everything. And all these 
things are also necessary, in that we could not have seen them  
otherwise, because there is only one time, where everything is 
linked causally. To claim otherwise is to stray into the area of the 
metaphysicians which Kant attacks throughout the Critique; or to 
go too far down the Humean, empirical road, where all our 
knowledge is forfeited, including our ability to distinguish between 
the objective and subjective.
Kant brings out this distinction with his two tables — there are 
many things possible logically, but only so many which are real. 
Only things which can be experienced empirically are real (allowing 
for the restrictions imposed by what Kant calls 'the grossness of my 
senses' (A226/B273), such as our not being to perceive what 
makes iron fillings jump, although we can deduce that magnetic 
forces exist). Anything that does not fall into the single time (and 
space) which gives form to our intuition cannot be experienced; we 
can claim no knowledge of it.
As Kant says, the modal categories, while adding nothing to our 
concept of something, 'restrict all categories to their merely 
empirical employment, and do not approve or allow their 
transcendental employment.' (A 219/B 266-7.) We can profess no 
knowledge of that which we cannot experience, even if the idea of 
the object is logically possible, in accordance with Kant's general 
logic, for this purely formal logic has no power to tell us anything of 
the content of our propositions; we must look to experience, to our 
synthetic unity, for that.
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A Kantian View of Modality
Kant's concern is always to avoid metaphysical excesses, 
establishing our knowledge on true foundations. It  is interesting to 
bear this in mind when we consider alternative, modern accounts of 
modality. In Kant's view, these would certainly constitute a step 
backwards, towards the realm of the metaphysicians that he argued 
so vehemently against two hundred years ago.
The obvious example here is Lewis's possible-worlds account, 
whereby he argues that everything that we consider metaphysically 
possible actually exists in some other world, of which we can have 
no direct experience whatsoever. Clearly, he owes us an account of 
how we can come to possess any knowledge of objects that by their 
very nature we cannot experience, and, as discussed previously, his 
answer is that our knowledge of these objects is no more 
problematic than our knowledge of mathematical objects. We 
readily attach truth-conditions to mathematical statements, he 
argues, without direct acquaintance with the objects concerned, 
and without fully understanding how we come by this mathematical 
knowledge as a result; but we accept this puzzle, of imaging that 
objects exist which we cannot experience, as a price worth paying 
for the valuable tool of mathematics. So with his possibi/lia. In 
assuming that everything deemed 'possible' really exists in some 
other world, just like our own, we can justify our attaching of truth- 
conditions to all such reasoning. We can move freely from 'logical' 
talk of necessary and possible, to our more ordinary way of 
thinking, as 'all' and 'some'. For Lewis, this is a 'philosopher's 
paradise', which makes the ontological cost, of a proliferation of 
possible worlds with their objects, a price worth paying.
130
However, clearly this is not the only cost involved. If  we follow Kant 
in holding that knowledge is only possible for us as humans if our 
intuition has the form of one unified time (and space), where 
objects interact according to certain necessary, a priori laws, then 
the price of Lewis's paradise is much higher than he thinks.
In giving any account of modality, there is the problem of deeming 
the existence of objects, which we at the same time say don't exist, 
because they are merely possible. How can we say that something 
is possible without requiring its existence in some way? For Kant, 
the answer is really quite straightforward, and not in the least 
counter-intuitive — he distinguishes between two kinds of 
possibility via his two forms of logic. In the former — general logic 
— we can talk of anything as possible that does not involve a 
contradiction. But, of course, it would be very silly of us, he seems 
to say, to think even for a minute that these things, logically 
possible though they are, actually exist. Formal logic pays no 
regard to content, after all — how could these statements tell us 
anything whatsoever about what there actually is outside us? 
General logic is no 'logic of truth.' For what really exists, we must 
look to our experience for guidance, and this is the realm dealt with 
by the transcendental logic that does take notice of content.
In the Table of Judgements, we find under the heading of Modality 
'Problematic', 'Assertoric', and 'Apodeictic', and Kant informs us that 
this function adds nothing to the content of a judgement, and 
'concerns only the value of the copula in relation to thought in 
general.' (A74/B100) Here, the understanding is attending merely
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to the logical status of the judgements concerned — for example, 
'problematic' 'expresses only logical (which is not objective) 
possibility,' and is one which 'may for a moment be assumed.' He 
goes on, 'like the indication of a false road among the number of all 
those roads that can be taken, it aids in the discovery of the true 
proposition.' (A75/B101) Kant is here describing a common-sense 
approach to understanding our process of reasoning — we do 
indeed consider logically possible, but not actually asserted, 
judgements 'for a moment' in our working our way to asserting a 
logically true claim.
The assertoric judgements are those to which we attach 'real' 
affirmation or negation, and those classed as 'apodeictic' are those 
where the affirmation or negation is deemed necessary. Kant 
describes our process of thought as passing through these three 
'moments' — we first consider a statement as logically possible, 
that is, as problematic, then accept it as true or assertoric, before 
finally, in seeing the assertoric as determined by the laws of the 
understanding, and therefore as a priori, as necessary or 
apodeictic.
This account, with its description of the formation of judgements 
where synthetic content plays no part, distinguishing these from 
judgements where synthetic content does come into play, suggests 
a different way of accounting for the meaning in our modal 
judgements. According to Kant, judgements that only take notice of 
'bare logic1 do not depend on what actually exists for their meaning. 
To take Lewis's example of the possibility of a talking donkey 
existing, the judgement is formed on the grounds that there is no
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logical contradiction in the concept of a donkey that can talk. We 
can construct the idea from our experience of actually-existing 
donkeys, and of speaking things, but content of the judgement 
itself does not depend on any such thing physically existing — this 
judgement concerns an analytical unity, not a synthetic one, and, 
as Kant says, the only constraint here is the logical one of the 
principle of non-contradiction. The employment by Kant of two 
tables regarding our judgements spells out the idea that, while such 
constructions of our thought are indeed logically possible, they form 
no part of our possible experience. The two things are quite 
distinct.
This bare logic, with no consideration of content, is transformed in 
the Table of Categories to the modality Kant believes we find in our 
synthetic judgements: possibility — impossibility, existence — non­
existence, and necessity — contingency. This transcendental logic, 
being a 'logic of truth', does indeed pay attention to content, and, 
as we might expect, this has consequences for the category of 
modality.
While Kant is, of course, at pains to emphasise the close 
relationship between the two tables, particularly as he wants to 
claim his categories are exhaustive, and that we can know this from 
their being developed from the first table, it is perhaps misleading 
to describe the second as embodying a kind of'logic' at all. Because 
we are looking to content here, and applying the categories to our 
spatio-temporal manifold, what our applications of the modal 
categories concern isn't so much logic as a question of what we 
know to exist, or not exist. This leads Kant to the perhaps
133
surprising claim which he makes in the Postulates of Empirical 
Thought, that we can have no more possibly existing objects in the 
world than we have actually existing objects, and that, further, 
there will also be the same number of necessarily existing objects.
This might seem highly counter-intuitive, surely there are always a 
greater number of actual things than necessary things, and still 
more of those which are necessary? However, Kant does not mean 
to go against this at all. To take the account of the possible and 
actual, in his Table of Judgements, Kant acknowledges the place of 
the possible in our assessing judgements in a purely logical way; 
here, however, in the field of transcendental logic, content comes 
into play, and this is what we must bear in mind as we interpret 
Kant's remarks. If  we can only apply the categories to what is 
presented to the understanding from the manifold in space and 
time, then such logically possible things as (to use Kant's own 
example) a shape enclosed by two straight lines is immediately 
recognised as impossible. Thus what exists logically does not exist 
objectively. In the same way, anything whatsoever which we could 
not experience, which, in Kantian terms, exists nowhere in space 
and time, is not merely something which does not actually exist, it 
is something which is also impossible. He writes:
Other forms of intuition than space and time, other forms of 
understanding than the discursive forms of thought, or of 
knowledge through concepts, even if they should be 
possible, we cannot render in any way conceivable and 
comprehensible to ourselves; and even assuming that we 
could do so, they still would not belong to experience — the
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only kind of knowledge in which objects are given to us. 
Whether other perceptions than those belonging to our 
whole possible experience, and therefore a quite different 
field of matter, may exist, the understanding is not in a 
position to decide. It  can deal only with the synthesis of that 
which is given. (A230-1/B283.)
Therefore, while the modal categories do tell us of a thing 'the 
cognitive faculty from which it springs and in which it has its seat' 
(A234/B287), they do not permit us to multiply the number of 
entities open to our possible experience. Possibility is 'merely a 
positing of the thing in relation to the understanding (in its 
empirical employment), actuality is at the same time a connection 
of it with perception.' (A234/B287, footnote) But this is not to claim 
that there are any more entities to which we claim experience, or 
attribute any kind of existence. To add to the number of possible 
something which would render some actual Kant, as discussed 
previously, won't allow, for such an addition is 'impossible' — 'What 
can be added is only a relation to my understanding, namely, that 
in addition to agreement with the formal conditions of experience 
there should be connection with some perception. But whatever is 
connected with perception in accordance with empirical laws is 
actual, even although it is not immediately perceived.' (A231/B284, 
italics added)
The crucial thing here is the claim, 'in accordance with empirical 
laws.' Anything outside of this cannot be judged as either possible 
or actual, as it simply cannot be experienced at all. Our possible 
experience consists of that which exists within space and time,
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connected according to the rule of causality. And here we find the 
reason for the second part of Kant's claim, that everything possible 
is actual and also necessary. The claim as to the necessity of every 
actually existing object is simply a consequence of Kant's 
contention that everything that exists does so because it is an 
event with a preceding cause. For Kant, of course, this perceived 
necessity is central to our being able to experience the world at all, 
and he reminds us of this in the Postulates:
The principle of continuity forbids any leap in the series of 
appearances, that is, of alterations...; it also forbids, in 
respect of the sum of all empirical intuitions in space, any 
gaps or cleft between two appearances...; for so we may 
express the proposition, that nothing which proves a 
vacuum, or which even admits it as a part of empirical 
synthesis, can enter into experience. (A228-9/B281)
Not only can such unconnected things, uncaused events, not be 
experienced; their being able to be so at all may 'do violence or 
detriment' (A229/B282) to the understanding itself. For Kant, it is 
of the utmost importance that everything be contained within one 
time and one space. Any violation in this continuum, and we would, 
as it were, lose track of where things might be placed, as necessity 
would no longer be such. All our experience would then begin to 
fragment, to unravel, leaving us with nothing, no sense of what 
objectively existed, and hence of our own selves as intuiting 
subjects. Therefore, everything actual, is insofar as it is necessarily 
caused, also necessary; were it not so, it could not form a part of 
our experience.
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Here we can see, then, that for Kant, everything that can and does 
exist is bound through causal laws within one space and time. 
Things that are not at a particular moment experienced by us 
constitute our possible experience — possible because, being 
present in space and connected with other objects in the world, 
they can come under our empirical experience. The only difference 
is, as Kant says, how the objects in the world are connected with 
our understanding — 'the cognitive faculty from which it springs 
and from which it has its s ea t/
This approach is in dramatic contrast to Lewis's, not just because it 
doesn't postulate a multitude of entities, but in its whole emphasis. 
Lewis wants to generate a 'philosopher's paradise', at almost any 
cost; Kant puts first our epistemology, otherwise, he believes, our 
reasoning is useless and meaningless.
Lewis's view is that everything formally possible, which we might 
choose to talk about, really does exist. His answer to the difficulty 
of our apparently assuming the existence of things that do not 
exist, but are only possible, is to distinguish between two possible 
ranges for the existential quantifier. This results in our saying that 
everything possible does exist, while also being able to consistently 
deny their existence because in the other range — that relating to 
our world — they do not.
Kant, on the other hand, would not find this very persuasive. For a 
start, it is putting the cart before the horse, as it were, in allowing 
logic, rather than experience, to dictate what exists. Throughout
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the Critique, Kant is as opposed to the metaphysical, rationalist- 
based approach to knowledge as he is to the radical empiricism 
espoused by Hume. All knowledge, he believes, must be tied to our 
experience. If  we employ reason alone, such as the metaphysicians 
do, we end up being able to apply logic to argue just about 
anything we choose — how is this 'knowledge'? We must 
supplement our reasoning with the contents of experience, to arrive 
at truth, in just the same way as the purely logical Table of 
Judgements tells us nothing about the content of our experience, 
and needs to be supplemented by the Table of Categories if we are 
to attain any knowledge at all of the way things really are. Only 
synthetic judgements give us actual knowledge, reason alone 
cannot. There are certain areas, Kant believes, which lie outside our 
possible experience, and therefore where we cannot claim to — or 
know — anything. We can apply reason there, and produce the 
illusion of knowledge, but it is only that — an illusion. We must 
always restrict our judgement to the areas of possible experience, 
to what lies within our spatio-temporal framework, if we are to 
attain knowledge.
We can apply this outlook to Lewis's possible worlds and see exactly 
what Kant would have to say about such an approach. Clearly, 
here, there are things that are claimed to be able to be known by 
us as objectively existing, and yet, on Kant's account, we could 
never claim to know this. In his view, our knowledge is dependent 
on our intuitions of space and time, and these intuitions are of one 
space and one time, that they must exist as unified wholes, if we 
are to experience anything within them at all. Our having any 
knowledge of something's existing outside of this framework is not
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only impossible epistemologically, it threatens the whole coherence 
of that framework itself, upon which our knowledge depends. Kant's 
whole point about why it is that everything (really) possible is 
actual is that we can't have any knowledge of anything outside this 
sphere, and yet, clearly that is exactly what Lewis is claiming we 
must be doing if we employ modal judgements. It  looks like, if we 
go down Lewis's road, everything is starting to fragment.
Lewis thinks that there isn't a problem between making the critical 
distinction between what is knowledge of the actual world, and of 
the infinite number of possible worlds, because we have an 
empirical acquaintance with the objects of this world (directly or 
indirectly), and not of the others. This enables us to understand 
which it is that is knowledge of this world because this a posteriori, 
empirically-based knowledge is contingent; whereas our a priori 
knowledge of the other worlds is necessary. Kant wouldn't accept 
this, as he would deny that we have any such necessary knowledge 
of possible objects. We can know what is and isn't logically possible, 
through the application of the forms of judgement to various 
concepts we might possess, but this is hardly the same thing as 
knowing the contents of an infinite number of possible worlds a 
priori. Kant's doctrine of the essential unity of space and of time 
precludes the claiming of any such knowledge; as he says, the 
categories are restricted to their proper empirical employment only. 
This is because they are applied, by the understanding, to the 
material given through our faculty of intuition, what Kant terms 'the 
introduction of transcendental content' (A79/B105), to give us 
knowledge. There is no 'content' brought to bear on the categories 
from outside our own single space and time, simply because
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anything existing outside this cannot possibly be known by us to 
exist. Content, for Kant, just is that which is experienced by us, and 
therefore from within this space and time alone.
Unsurprisingly, then, while we might criticise Lewis by questioning 
whether we ever can reduce necessity in the way suggested, it is 
surely the epistemological difficulties of Lewis's account which are 
most striking, particularly when compared with Kant's approach. His 
description of infinite possible worlds, all of which exist as 
concretely as our own (just in another, separate time and place) 
sounds like 'an art very commonly practised by metaphysical 
jugglers' (A63/B88). It  doesn't seem to tell us anything of what 
really lies behind our ordinary, everyday use of modal concepts, 
while also laying claim to vast areas of knowledge where it seems 
we actually can't claim to know anything at all; and all this is before 
we even get to Kant's argument that straying into other times and 
spaces would ultimately mean that we had no knowledge 
whatsoever. Further, if Kant is right that only one space and time 
can and does exist, then Lewis is just wrong to claim otherwise.
And he makes his strange claim without evidence, whereas Kant 
has much to say for his view. This is because Kant seems to win out 
over Lewis not just in maintaining the integrity of our system of 
knowledge, but also in sticking close to our own intuitions of what 
lies behind our modal thinking. It  seems most unlikely that 
something as bizarre and counter-intuitive as an infinite number of, 
and our knowledge of, possible worlds is what underlies our use of 
modal terms. This appears particularly so when we consider the 
central, and everyday, role they play in so much of our thought 
processes and our use of language in communicating with others.
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In his depiction of modal terms as applying either in a purely logical 
way, where there is no commitment to anything's actual existence, 
or in a metaphysical way, where we are dealing with the contents of 
experience, be it possible experience or actual, Kant seems to give 
an account which is entirely in keeping with concepts which are 
used 'everyday', and by everyone. There is nothing strange or 
mystical going on here, as Lewis's account seems to suggest there 
has to be, whenever we use a modal term.
Kit Fine's approach to modality, meanwhile, might seem much 
closer in spirit to Kant's. As discussed previously, he argues that 
the account offered by the likes of Lewis, where statements of 
necessity, possibility and actuality is reduced to talk of possible 
worlds, fails to account for what he regards as the crucial notion of 
essence. The standard approach takes the essence of something to 
be that which is true of it in all possible worlds — in other words, it 
is the same thing as saying, what properties are necessary to it.
Fine compares this with the statement that gives an informal, but 
nonetheless representative, depiction of our ordinary, everyday 
idea of essence — 'we say "the object must have that property if it 
is to be the object that it is".' (p. 4 .) His point is that the concept of 
necessity is not equivalent to this at all, as it does not allow us to 
distinguish between other properties which are necessarily true, 
and therefore 'true in all possible worlds', and those which we 
would accept as being essential because they are relevant to the 
object's being the object that it is.
To draw out this point, he compares the necessary property of the 
singleton Socrates, of having Socrates belong to it if he exists, with
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that of Socrates's property of his beionging to the singleton 
Socrates if he exists. Both properties are necessary — true in every 
possible world. But, while the property of having Socrates as a 
member is clearly essential to the singleton, we would not want to 
say that the property of belonging to the singleton is in any way 
essential to Socrates's being what he is. We thus want to make a 
distinction between saying that something is true of something in 
every possible world, with saying that it is essential to that thing.
To suggest saying that a property is essential if it is both necessary 
and also somehow relevant to that thing is no help, for that is to 
presuppose precisely what we were seeking to explain — essence — 
in the first place. He writes, 'there is nothing in the "logic" of the 
situation to justify an asymmetric judgement of relevance; the 
difference lies entirely in the nature of the objects in question.' (p. 
7.)
There is an obvious comparison to be made here between the 
capabilities Kant saw in his general logic, and those which he saw in 
his transcendental logic. Whereas one is strictly formal, paying no 
attention to content, the other does look to the nature of the object 
within the judgement. Fine compares the asymmetry in what is 
essential to Socrates, and the singleton Socrates, with the 
symmetry in the modal account, of what properties are necessary 
to them — 'no corresponding modal asymmetry can be made out.' 
(p. 5.) In the same way, Kant's transcendental logic looks to 
empirical content — to the objects which we are judging — and this 
sensitivity to the objects themselves, as opposed to purely formal, 
logical relations, allows us to acknowledge and represent to 
ourselves both symmetrical and asymmetrical relations between
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these objects (as Nussbaum argued). This is a clear difference 
between both forms of logic, and one that cannot be accounted for 
if we depend upon general logic alone. As Kant says, in 
transcendental logic, a transcendental content is introduced, and it 
is this to which the transcendental logic is applied. This 
transcendental content is given through the synthetic unity; it is the 
world that we experience, as we experience it. Transcendental logic 
takes notice of objects, what exists in the world, whereas general 
logic merely tells us of the purely formal relations between 
concepts.
Compare Fine:
Thus different essentially induced truths may have their 
source in the identities of different objects... an induced truth 
which concerns various objects may have its source in the 
nature of some of these objects but not of others. This is 
how it is with our standard example of Socrates being a 
member of singleton Socrates; for this is true in virtue of the 
identity of singleton Socrates, but not of the identity of 
Socrates. The concept of metaphysical necessity, on the 
other hand, is insensitive to source: all objects are treated 
equally as possible grounds of necessary truth, (p. 9.)
So, our standard logic alone cannot distinguish between which 
properties are essential and which logically necessary, so 'fixing' the 
relation of components of our judgements, and it is our 
understanding of the objects as they are themselves which does
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this. For an answer to the puzzle of asymmetric relations, we must 
look to the objects themselves.
For Kant, the question immediately arises: how is it that we know? 
What is it, for us, that enables us to interpret the world around us 
in this way, such that we have an understanding of it and can make 
true judgements? For we can only experience these objects 
empirically; there must therefore be some way of sorting out all 
these varied impressions into a coherent vision of the world.
Without establishing the answer to this, we cannot know the correct 
range for our knowledge; it is the most central question. Fine, on 
the other hand, has nothing to say here. The essence of an object 
by which we know the object that it is, is something we just grasp 
or see. He offers us no clue as to how, exactly, we know which 
properties of an object we carve off, as it were, and which we 
recognise as being the essence of the object.
Central to Kant's epistemology is that we can only know things as 
they appear to us, and never as they are in themselves. This 
division is highly controversial and has attracted much criticism; 
commentators like Strawson have tried to reformulate what they 
see as being the 'good' parts of his argument in the Critique, 
without it. In fact, however, it is an indispensable feature of his 
thesis. As has been discussed previously, Kant's point is that if we 
are to have knowledge at all, then that knowledge must be shaped 
by who we are, by how we must therefore perceive the world 
around us; and these conditions will both help to justify the 
knowledge that we can lay legitimate claim to, and delineate those 
areas where we cannot claim to know anything at all — these will
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be those areas where the conditions for our knowledge cannot 
apply. As humans, we are reliant on our senses for knowledge — 
this intuition is all we can know of the objects around us. So, when 
Kant claims that we can only know objects not as they are in 
themselves but as they appear to us, he is not merely saying that 
for each appearance there must be an object which it is an 
appearance of; he is making an important claim about the nature of 
our knowledge, which underpins the whole Critique. That we 
actively think, and construct our sensory intuitions into thoughts of, 
knowledge of, objects, indicates that there must be things which 
are necessary about us, which can be known a priori — and it is 
these necessary conditions which Kant believes he has uncovered in 
his Critique. Because we are dependent upon these conditions for 
our knowledge, we can only ever know things as they appear to us; 
it would take an intellectual, rather than sensory, intuition — like 
God's, if he exists — to be able to dispense with such 
epistemological equipment as concepts and a spatio-temporal 
framework. God can grasp things with his intellect — he need not 
shape or construct various sense-impressions into something that 
might count as knowledge. He is in direct contact, therefore, with 
the object as it is in itself, with no need to categorise it or apply any 
concepts to it, in order to understand what he is perceiving.
Fine seems to imagine that our knowledge is like this; indeed, at 
the end of the paper, he suggests that many might believe our 
understanding of essence relates to concepts of objects, whereas he 
believes that in fact our ideas of essence are of the objects as they 
are in themselves — 'I  believe that what is properly regarded as a 
definition of an object is sometimes treated as a definition of a
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concept or of a w o rd / (p. 14.) Essences, in his view, don't merely 
give us the definition of the concept of an object, but of the object 
itself — a direct intuition of the object in itself, like God would have. 
On his account, therefore, we really do know the objects as they 
are in themselves. However, he doesn't say how this is done, and 
so ends up, from a Kantian perspective, sounding just like Lewis; 
he too is straying into areas where he cannot claim to know 
anything at all, areas where the conditions necessary for our 
knowing anything at all — experience, within a spatio-temporal 
framework which enables us to relate all the objects experienced on 
to another — cannot apply. Where is this mystical faculty, which 
enables us to dispense with all forms of conceptual reasoning, 
freeing us to see each object on its own terms, unique, as a thing in 
itself? This just doesn't seem to be how we think at all. We do use 
concepts to help us to relate to the world, which implies there isn't 
the immediate apprehension which Fine suggests. Further, the fact 
remains that we just are sensory beings — this is how we acquire 
our knowledge of the world. There is no way in the world that Fine's 
description of an immediate grasping of something's essence could 
be the type of thing that comes through our senses — our 
knowledge is, as Kant suggests, a construction built from a constant 
comparison and adding together of various elements, with the aid 
of the understanding.
Given that Kant claims we can only know objects as they appear to 
us, how might he account for our concept of essence? It  seems that 
he would say our idea of what properties constitute the essence of 
something arises, not from some mysterious 'grasping' of each 
object's essence, but rather from a constant comparison made of
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various objects which we experience, and apply our categories and 
learned empirical concepts to. Thus, 'which make an object the 
object that it is' then becomes 'which make an object how it must 
appear to us to be.' We anticipate our perceptions is certain 
respects, according to the conditions necessary to us; and these 
objects, if we are to have knowledge of them, must conform to 
these conditions, to our categories which we apply to them. 
'Essence' is really another concept that helps us classify our 
knowledge, showing us, in this case, what it is about an object that 
enables us to identify it. I f  we had immediate intuition of the 
objects in themselves, then this would be yet another concept that 
we could dispense with, for then each object would be known to us 
as it existed, with all its properties contributing to that immediate 
knowledge. We could have no greater understanding of it than that. 
That we have the concept of essence at all, then, suggests that the 
Kantian view is correct, that we have knowledge of the objects only 
as they appear to us, and are required to classify the impressions of 
them and sort through them.
One criticism which might be made against Kant's account of 
modality is that it seems to preclude useful scientific reasoning. 
Kant's insistence that there is only one time, and therefore that 
everything possible is in fact actual, seems to run counter to the 
process whereby scientists formulate hypotheses and then test 
them, to establish what is the case. It  seems that here, there is 
more possible than actual; and isn't this what makes new 
discoveries possible in the first place? To this, Kant might reply that 
any new discoveries are in fact made within our existing spatio- 
temporal unity, and understood in terms of it — of what is around it
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and went before and after it. To the charge that any such reasoning 
is precluded, a possible solution is suggested by Kant's example of 
how general logic alone isn't enough for mathematical or geometric 
judgements either. He writes that there is nothing self-contradictory 
about the idea of a shape formed by two straight lines; it is only 
when we bring this idea before the intuition of space that we realise 
what was logically possible is not really possible at all. In a similar 
way, we could say that scientists formulate hypotheses in 
accordance with ideas already held and within which there is no 
contradiction; they then look to experience to see what is really the 
case. Again, there is only one real possibility here — that which we 
find to be the case.
However, it might be objected that this account takes no notice of 
the essentialism found in statements regarding natural kinds. Kant 
had no concept of any such thing as 'the analytic a posteriori', 
which many find in such statements as, 'All cats are mammals.' He 
always linked necessity with the a priori, and so might not have 
accepted this. However, George Bealer offers an account that 
marries both the a priori and empirical experience in justifying the 
necessity we find in such statements. As we have seen, in his 
paper, 'The Philosophical Limits of Scientific Essentialism,' he sets 
out to establish what might be used to justify the 'modal leap' from 
what we notice, through observation, to be the case, to asserting 
that this is necessarily the case, as happens in the establishing of 
scientific laws. He quotes Kant at the outset: 'Experience tells us, 
indeed, what is, but not that it must necessarily be so, and not 
otherwise.' (B3)
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Interestingly, like Nussbaum, Fine, and of course Kant, Bealer 
appeals to an asymmetry, in his argument for an alternative 
approach. He notes that there are some hypothetical cases that we 
would be prepared to base our scientific formulations on, and 
others that we would reject immediately as being somehow 'bad 
intuitions'. To these bad intuitions we assign the status of 
something like the gambler's fallacy — we would be quite wrong to 
base anything on them at all. However, asks Bealer — 'Why is the 
cut just here?' (p. 345) How can we tell the genuine hypothetical 
cases from the 'bad' ones? Clearly, it cannot be any difference in 
our experience; but we need something through which we can 
account for this difference, for such intuitions are essential to the 
'modal leap' whereby we establish our scientific principles. Like 
Kant, Bealer concludes that some element found not in experience 
but in us must provide the answer. And this will have the potential 
to justify that step to necessity, as it does not come through our 
senses alone.
Bealer's argument is convincing. In his long paper, he examines 
different alternative ways in which the genuine intuitions might be 
accounted for, concluding that only one is reasonable — his 
naturalizied rationalism, which states that knowledge is always 
dependent upon rationalism but not always solely dependent upon 
it, as in the case of science where experience is equally vital. (Note 
that the idea of mixing the two elements like this, with each equally 
important, is itself Kantian in spirit.)
When we supplement this account of the source of the necessity 
employed in scientific statements, with that given of our ordinary
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modal thinking in the Critique, a strong position is generated. Kant 
has given us a picture of our modal language that, unlike that of 
Lewis and Fine, gives us little or no problems in terms of 
epistemology, and, in dramatic contrast to Lewis, is similarly 
straightforward metaphysically. Perhaps best of all, it maintains a 
common-sense perspective, vital in an area so central to our 
everyday thought and communication as modality.
However, it is important to recognise that this has been achieved 
through the advocation of a single, unified space and time, without 
which no such 'modal leap' would have been possible, and nor 
would the distinction we want to draw between our reasonings of 
what is possible, and our experience of what is actual. It  is this 
framework which constrains our judgements a priori, providing for 




The classic sceptical problem is how we can ever be certain of, or 
justify, our (apparent) knowledge of the external world, and this 
question often has its root in the idea of ourselves as having to 
bridge a gap between our inner selves, our minds which perceive 
and think, and the external world, which seems quite separate from 
us. If  we do not create it or influence it in any way, if it is indeed 
quite separate from us, then how can we ever be certain if our 
knowledge of it is correct? Indeed, is any knowledge of it possible 
at all?
Kant's response has been to argue that there must be certain 
elements in our thinking which are present a priori. Without these, 
we could not have any thoughts or experience at all; further, these 
necessary conditions on our experience serve to delineate the area 
beyond which we cannot reasonably claim to know anything 
whatsoever. In a sense, Kant would probably see the sceptic as 
straying into this area, assuming things really might be other than 
they are, and yet we would still be able to have experience in order 
to form judgements (such as, that Kant might be wrong). We 
cannot formulate these questions without imagining ourselves as 
perhaps beyond the area where, Kant claims, our judgement can be 
legitimately applied. However, clearly this is question-begging, and 
Kant also has his positive reasons for claiming the sceptic is 
mistaken.
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I have singled out the claim that time (and also space) must be 
thought as both unique and unified, if we are to have any 
experience at all. It  is the pure intuition, which is the form of all our 
intuitions. It  orders our experience, allowing the world to become 
an object for us, and hence enabling us to form judgements 
regarding it; and for this to be possible, the world must correspond 
to our intuition, or else it would have no application.
What, then, are the alternative views, views which would deny that 
we had any such a priori conditions? One such alternative would be 
simply to deny that there are any a priori conditions on our 
knowledge, for there simply is no such thing as a priori knowledge; 
and, of course, Kant's most famous target, Hume, held just such a 
view. He believed that all our knowledge was ultimately sensory, 
and hence that there was no a priori knowledge of any kind. Such 
apparent examples to the contrary as the principle of causality were 
dismissed by Hume as nothing more than the result of seeing one 
event repeatedly following another. Of course, Hume had to say 
this, as there is nothing to 'see' that might be termed the law of 
causality, and he can't allow that there is any alternative source of 
such knowledge. But Kant turns this on its head, arguing that 
without causality, no knowledge would be possible as there would 
be no way of our experiencing the world. Such a conclusion implies 
that this knowledge must be present prior to our experience, not 
only because it is clear that, as Hume pointed out, it cannot be 
discerned through our senses, but also because the very possibility 
of experience itself depends upon it. Without causality to bind the 
objects of our experience together, we cannot perceive events, and 
all our potential for knowledge is lost. Further, if the world cannot
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be understood as existing objectively, then our own idea of 
ourselves is lost, too. And we do have such a concept of 
subjectivity. So Kant's view, then, seems more plausible than 
Hume's.
There are other difficulties with the strictly empirical view of Hume. 
Mathematics ends up as being either true by convention, or simply 
a branch of analytic knowledge, and hence, arguably, dull and 
uninformative. And we are left with no answer to the question of 
how we can sort the multitude of sensory fragments constantly 
pouring in through our senses, into coherent thoughts of objects 
and events. Moreover, if Bealer is right, then we lose our means of 
accounting for and justifying the modal 'leap' inherent in uncovering 
necessary scientific laws.
A further outcome of a Kantian account of our thinking is that a 
convincing account is generated of our application of modal terms 
in forming judgements. Alternatives which do not depend upon the 
constraint of a priori elements in our understanding, and the 
necessary ordering imposed by the pure intuition of time, leave us 
without a plausible account of this vital element in so much of our 
thought and speech. This in itself seems to be a strong reason for 
adopting his position.
In general, our nature as finite, sensory beings means that, if we 
are to have experience, communicate, and think of ourselves as 
subjects, then there must be a means whereby the world can 
become an object for us, and if these conditions are the conditions 
for our experience itself, then they must be present a priori. And
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synthetic a priori knowledge can therefore be attained, regarding 
these conditions. Further, and perhaps equally importantly, the 
uncovering of these constraints also reveals the limits to our human 
knowledge, beyond which, we cannot claim to know anything at all. 
The laying down of these conditions can be seen as an alternative 
to the sceptical position on our knowledge — while it is true that we 
cannot claim to know anything beyond here, within these 
boundaries experience is possible, and our knowledge legitimate.
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